It was one of the darkest hours in the history of an institution that already commands little public respect. It was also perhaps one of the least democratic means by which the European Union, itself afflicted by a democratic deficit, has forced through one of its most controversial measures.
The issue is the so-called interim Chat Control regulation, also known as Chat Control 1.0. Providers may once again automatically scan unencrypted communications for child sexual abuse material and patterns associated with grooming and report suspected cases. Authorities may receive these reports and the accompanying data and use them in criminal investigations.
An additional amendment adopted alongside the measure exempted end-to-end encryption. This means that messages sent through Signal, Threema or WhatsApp are not supposed to be scanned directly on users’ devices or before encryption. The Council of the EU now has three months to approve the amendment.
The previous arrangement remained in force until March this year, when it expired. The European Parliament had rejected an extension.
A Second Vote Without New Arguments
Leading figures were unhappy with that rejection. Without presenting any new arguments, they simply launched another attempt to extend interim Chat Control.
The political initiative for a second vote came from members of the European People’s Party (EPP) aligned with Manfred Weber. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola and the Council of EU member states had also shown a strong interest in extending the expired rules without substantial changes.
Critics rightly saw this as an attempt to force a previously defeated proposal through Parliament by exploiting procedural rules. Unfortunately, that attempt has now succeeded.
The European Parliament held the vote yesterday under an expedited procedure. Under this process, the legislation did not require the support of a majority of all MEPs to pass. Instead, an absolute majority of Parliament was needed to reject it.
A total of 314 MEPs voted against the measure, 276 voted in favor and 17 abstained. The motion to reject nevertheless failed because 361 votes were required in the second reading.
In other words, a relative majority opposed the legislation, yet it was still adopted. It had been clear beforehand that the absolute majority required to defeat it was out of reach.
Parliamentary Objections Cast Aside
Despite complaints from numerous MEPs, the president of the European Parliament allowed the vote to go ahead. The outcome was therefore predictable.
The vote took place on the final sitting day before Parliament’s summer recess, by which time numerous MEPs had already left. For citizens who cannot simply head off on holiday before their work is done, this naturally raises questions. Why do we have highly paid representatives who can afford to miss such an important vote?
The EU has once again shown, more starkly than ever, how readily it disregards and scorns democracy, parliamentary conventions and institutional norms whenever influential figures find them inconvenient.
Here, the Union revealed its authoritarian face, one that is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. The legislation reflects the same mindset. Once again, under the banner of protecting children and young people, the aim is comprehensive surveillance. This time, the target is the messaging services most people use every day.
The fact that encryption remains untouched offers little reassurance, as that protection may not last.
A Bad Day for European Democracy
In the end, the vote amounted to nothing more than a shabby procedural trick. MEPs had already delivered their verdict in March 2026, and the interim arrangement had lawfully expired in April. The matter had been settled.
Putting a rejected measure back on the agenda shortly before the summer recess, invoking an expedited procedure and then forcing it through Parliament by exploiting the rules was an extraordinary act of procedural manipulation.
Yesterday, 9 July, was a bad day for European democracy. The only consolation may be that even within Parliament, critics accused its leaders of continuing to hold votes until they obtained the result they wanted.
The extension of the interim rules, now expected to remain in force until April 2028, is far from the end of the matter.
The permanent Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) regulation, known as Chat Control 2.0, is still moving through the legislative process and is intended to establish a much broader system of surveillance. Providers would be required to assess risks, introduce protective measures, report suspicious material, remove or block content and cooperate with a new EU center and law enforcement authorities.
The greatest unresolved question is whether, and in what form, encrypted and other private communications will be brought within this system.
That will ultimately determine whether Chat Control 2.0 is genuinely confined to protecting children or becomes the first step toward permanent, far-reaching control of private communications. The latest experience offers ample grounds for pessimism.