Germany: Europe’s Hesitant Hegemon?

It sees itself as both the bloc’s economic pillar and its financial scapegoat. As of 2025, Germany remains Europe’s unquestioned hegemon, leveraging its economic weight to shape key policy decisions in EU institutions. Not coincidentally, Germans are overrepresented in the EU’s top positions. Case in point: for two decades, the European Commission’s President’s Chief of Cabinet has always been a German.

Since the 19th century, Berlin has pursued regional dominance in various forms; first, through Prussian militarism and later, through its sheer economic might. Otto von Bismarck's unification of Germany in 1871 made the nation a powerhouse, but his successors failed to maintain this new-found balance of power. The First and Second World Wars were in many ways ill-conceived attempts at restructuring Europe around German leadership—both ended in catastrophic defeat. Germany desperately wanted to join the “Concert of Great Powers” after other large European nations - France, the UK, Russia, Spain - had already established large colonial empires.

The postwar European project allowed Germany to assert economic dominance over the EU. Unlike its former aggressive militarism, this new strategy focused on shaping European institutions in Germany’s image by prioritising economic discipline, regulatory frameworks, and industrial policy.

For decades, Germans refused to speak about geopolitics openly. Any conversation about power, influence, or strategic dominance immediately evoked memories of Nazism and the horrors of World War II. However, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 shattered any such restraint. Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a fundamental shift in German policy, embracing significant military investment after years of Germany’s defence having been neglected.

Russia: Friend or Foe?

Over the past century, certain themes have united German politicians across party lines. In the early 20th century, Germans across the political spectrum rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the territorial changes it imposed, particularly regarding Poland. In 1919, the vast majority of German political parties and leaders, spanning the entire political spectrum, rejected the territorial concessions to Poland mandated by the treaty.

In the early 21st century, a national consensus had been reached regarding the importance of maintaining good relations with Russia.

This aspect of German foreign policy was visible in the early 2000s under Gerhard Schröder (SPD). As Chancellor, Schröder pushed for direct energy ties between Germany and Russia, emphasising the strategic importance of securing Russian gas supplies. He is one of the fathers of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, a major undersea natural gas pipeline system, designed to transport gas from Russia directly to Germany while bypassing transit countries like Ukraine and Poland.

Schröder paved the way for Angela Merkel (CDU), under which Nord Stream 1 was completed in 2011. With an annual capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm), NS1 significantly enhanced the volume of Russian gas exports to Europe.

Between 2000 and 2020, Russian natural gas exports to the EU increased significantly. In 2000, Gazprom supplied 120 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to the EU. By 2021, this figure had surged to 168 bcm, largely due to NS1. [STAT 2] (Source: International Energy Agency, 2023). By 2021, NS1 supplied two-thirds of Germany's total gas imports, emphasising its critical role in Europe's energy infrastructure.

‘Mutti’ consequently continued Berlin’s modern-day Rapallo Policy, supervising the completion of Nord Stream 2 in 2021. In September 2022, seven months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, both pipelines were damaged in a series of explosions in the Baltic Sea, which occurred near the Danish island of Bornholm. The explosions are suspected to have been caused by sabotage, though the perpetrators remain unidentified.

Germany and the European Union

Consistently, Germany has pushed the EU toward becoming a centralised super-state. This culminated in a proposal for revising the European treaties which four German MEPs—Sven Simon (Christian Democrat), Gabriele Bischoff (Social Democrat), Daniel Freund (left-wing environmentalist) and Helmut Scholz (post-communist) — presented with Belgian liberal Guy Verhofstadt’s backing in August 2023. The document lists the “Russian aggression against Ukraine”, the “glaring lack of functionality of the current EU” and the “need to face geopolitical challenges” as reasons for the sudden necessity of federalising the EU.

The authors of the document suggested 42 far-reaching amendments to the treaties. Their implementation would drastically reduce the room to manoeuvre of EU member states in fundamental aspects of policy making. Bearing all the hallmarks of “competence creep”, they would affect matters of defence, education, health, industry, climate policy, and many others. No wonder the above-mentioned Guy Verhofstadt is on board with such an initiative. The former Belgian PM was previously the head of the liberal ALDE faction (today’s Renew Europe) in the European Parliament from 2009 to 2019 and is the author of a book entitled “The United States of Europe”.

Many Germans believe their country is unfairly burdened by EU subsidies, seeing their financial contributions as driven by lingering guilt over World War II rather than shared European interests. The AfD capitalises on this sentiment, advocating for Germany’s disengagement from the EU to reclaim national sovereignty. Additionally, nostalgia for the Deutsche Mark remains strong, with many convinced that adopting the Euro was merely a concession to secure French support for reunification.

Anti-Americanism

A persistent anti-American streak can also be observed across the country, especially following Donald Trump’s comeback as U.S. President. While Germany remains a key NATO ally, a certain level of skepticism toward American leadership persists, particularly regarding economic policy, military interventions, and the dominance of American technology companies. This sentiment cuts across political lines, from the left-wing opposition to U.S. foreign policy to right-wing concerns about economic dependence on Washington. Germany’s predicted future chancellor, Friedrich Merz (CDU), openly talks about disentangling his country from the U.S.

Earlier this year, Germany’s outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) assured Copenhagen of Germany’s willingness to defend Danish interests in Greenland in the face of Trump’s bold statement about its possible annexation. He also expressed his disapproval regarding the American president’s proposal of offering future aid for Kyiv only in exchange for U.S. access to Ukraine’s mineral resources.

Today, Germany’s political class projects an image of reluctant leadership which despite having great economic power is seemingly compromised to flaunt that fact. But this apparent passivity should not deceive anyone. Germany’s hesitance to embrace its hegemonic role is not a sign of weakness, but a strategic manoeuvre allowing Berlin to shape Europe’s future while avoiding the burdens of openly acknowledging its dominance.