The Heritage of Angela Merkel

Her rule was characterised not by ideological conviction but by a relentless pursuit of power through pragmatic opportunism, tactical ambiguity, and a gradual hollowing out of the conservative identity of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Far from embodying the principles of her predecessors, Merkel systematically dismantled the ideological foundations of Germany’s center-right, shifting the CDU into an amorphous political entity more interested in securing coalitions than in articulating a coherent vision for the future. This legacy—one of depoliticisation, institutional stagnation, and strategic moralizing—has left Germany economically weakened, socially fragmented, and politically paralysed, a reality that is now impossible to ignore.

Merkel’s takeover of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has a precise date: December 22, 1999. In an op-ed for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung – at the time a leading publication of Germany’s bourgeois-conservative milieu – she distanced herself from her political mentor, Helmut Kohl. Kohl, who had governed Germany for 16 years as Chancellor and left an indelible mark on the CDU, was embroiled in a party financing scandal. Merkel demanded that the party must “learn to walk” on its own; the declaration paved the way for her own rise to power.

At that time, Merkel was still CDU General Secretary, but by April 2000, the party had already elected her as its leader. Amid a deep-seated scandal that threatened to shake the CDU to its core, Merkel cast herself as an untainted reformer. Her ascent was reminiscent of Joan of Arc: devoid of political baggage, seemingly untouched by internal factionalism, but resolutely determined to reshape the CDU.

Over the 76 years of Germany’s post-war history, CDU chancellors have governed the country for 54 years – making the story of modern Germany, in many ways, a CDU story. Initially, Merkel was perceived as a stabilising force, ensuring that the CDU would not meet the same fate as Italy’s Democrazia Cristiana, which collapsed after years of dominance in the wake of a corruption scandal. At the same time, Merkel, the “woman from the East”, appeared to be controllable. Powerful male networks such as the Andean Pact – to which Friedrich Merz belonged – still dominated the party. During this phase, Merz became CDU parliamentary leader.

Yet Merkel was underestimated. She proved to be politically flexible and pragmatic, but with one clear priority: consolidating her own power base. Rivals were either co-opted or eliminated. Friedrich Merz, who had been considered as finance minister in a CDU shadow cabinet in 2002, was among her first casualties. Throughout her chancellorship, Merkel systematically dismantled the party’s internal opposition, reshaping the CDU in her own image.

The CDU: An Evergreen Goes Green

The CDU’s transformation into a chancellor’s electoral machine was nothing new, but under Merkel, this process reached an unprecedented level. The party, once identified with conservative principles, became streamlined and adaptable – particularly in its approach to the media and potential coalition partners. Repeated grand coalitions with the SPD and a strategic rapprochement with the Greens illustrated a CDU increasingly willing to abandon core conservative tenets.

As early as 1976, Franz Josef Strauß warned that “there must be no democratically legitimate party to the right of the CDU/CSU”. This was not a warning against right-wing extremism per se, but an internal admonition: the CDU had to ensure that the democratic right remained within the party. Merkel disregarded this principle. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) capitalized on the vacuum left behind and, in turn, pushed the CDU further into alliances with the left-wing parties.

Merkel, having been socialized in East Germany’s socialist system, never internalised the CDU’s ideological constants in their original form. She placed herself in the tradition of Konrad Adenauer, yet lacked his Catholic, conservative, and deeply European worldview. While Adenauer and de Gaulle saw European integration as a cultural and civilizational mission, Merkel reduced the EU to a technocratic instrument of policy.

Merkel’s politics were always defined by immediate power retention rather than long-term strategic vision. She had no overarching plan for Germany’s future, nor a coherent governance doctrine. Her major policy shifts – such as the energy transition following Fukushima or the migration policy of 2015 – were primarily tactical maneuvers, executed without fully considering their long-term consequences.

A phenomenon commonly referred to in Germany as “Mehltau” (mildew) settled over many aspects of the country under Angela Merkel’s chancellorship. While her government became an early adopter of “nudging” policies popularized by Barack Obama in the U.S, and pursued left-wing ideological projects—ranging from same-sex marriage to the state-sponsored funding of far-left NGOs under the guise of “promoting democratic values”—little progress was made in crucial areas such as digitalisation, infrastructure, or technological innovation.

Decaying Discourse, Decaying Deutschland

At the 2024 European Football Championship, international visitors were confronted with a disillusioning reality: not only had Germany de facto no-go areas, but its public transport system—once a symbol of efficiency—was plagued by chronic delays, particularly within its railway network. The very country that promoted itself as being environmentally progressive, by for example actively curbing car use, proved incapable of maintaining basic trust in its much-lauded public transport system. The most visible emblem of this political decline is Berlin, a capital once marketed with the slogan “poor but sexy”. Beyond its imposing yet bleak government buildings, the city presents itself as a landscape of graffiti, alternative lifestyles, and urban decay—evoking memories of a past that many visitors from Central and Eastern Europe believed had long been left behind.

Germany's external neglect, reminiscent in many ways of the final years of the GDR, from which Merkel herself hails, finds its political counterpart in the rigidity of governance. The German political apparatus follows predetermined plans drafted under stringent bureaucratic oversight, leaving no room for deviation or course correction. The repeal of failed legislation is virtually unheard of.

This institutional paralysis was mirrored in Merkel's electoral strategy. She deliberately avoided polarisation or political confrontation, instead cultivating a bland, reassuring aura designed to lull both supporters and opponents into complacency. This approach, termed asymmetrical demobilisation, sapped enthusiasm from the electorate, reducing voter turnout across the political spectrum. Merkel mastered the art of depoliticising campaign discourse, stripping her rivals of pressing issues by overlaying the country with a suffocating political inertia. Slogans like “Für ein Deutschland in dem wir gut und gerne leben” (For a Germany in which we live well and gladly) or simply “You know me” encapsulated this method perfectly: securing relative majorities without making concrete promises or policy commitments.

Yet to this day, it remains unclear who Angela Merkel truly is—or to what extent her upbringing in East Germany influenced her governing style. During the COVID-19 crisis, she ruled through a chancellor-led directorate alongside state premiers—an arrangement lacking constitutional legitimacy. In Thuringia, she personally intervened to overturn the election of FDP minister-president Thomas Kemmerich, merely because he had received votes from the AfD. At the Federal Constitutional Court, she placed loyal party figures like Stephan Harbarth, while in the Federal Presidency, she installed apparatchiks such as Christian Wulff and Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

The Historical Burden of Merkel

Merkel’s legacy reveals a limited understanding of Germany’s constitutional order and its corrective mechanisms. Instead, she fostered a coalition between a dominant ruling party and bloc parties, a tendency mirrored by the Green Party, whose ideological roots lie in the radical upheavals of 1968. Figures like former Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin, shaped by Maoist training, exemplify this lineage. The question of whether Merkel’s pivot toward the left and the Greens was a strategic move or sheer opportunism can only be answered with an unequivocal yes to both. The Greens, representing the young, affluent bourgeoisie, do not constitute a counterforce to the CDU’s traditional base but rather a natural evolution of its urban elite—an integration rather than a rupture.

Strauß’s warning has now become a prophecy fulfilled. The AfD occupies the space the CDU abandoned as it shifted leftward and presents itself as the sole authentic opposition to the political establishment. Merkel’s governance fostered an unspoken coalition of self-proclaimed “democratic parties”, encompassing the SPD, Greens, and Left Party, as well as the CDU and FDP. This alignment further deepened the political divide between AfD voters and the mainstream parties.

As a result, the CDU faces a fundamental dilemma: Many voters to the right of center demand a break from Merkel-era policies, but such a shift would require renouncing its recent past. Simultaneously, a strong faction within the CDU seeks to maintain Merkel’s course to facilitate future coalitions with the SPD and Greens. This faction also drives the so-called “firewall” (Brandmauer) strategy, which categorically excludes any cooperation with the AfD – even in parliamentary votes on policy matters. In doing so, the CDU effectively eliminates any pathway to power without left-wing coalition partners.

This dynamic has effectively created a two-bloc political system in Germany: the AfD on one side and all other parties on the other. Under Merkel, political discourse increasingly became morally polarised. CDU politicians denounced the AfD as a threat to democracy, even as their own party, once led by the staunch anti-Communist Adenauer, now collaborates more readily with the Left Party, the successor of East Germany’s ruling SED, than with the AfD.

Today, the AfD polls at around 20 percent, and the societal divide continues to widen. Germany remains unable to answer the question of how to address an electorate where a quarter of voters feel unrepresented by the political mainstream. A Bundestag in which legislative proposals are blocked simply because they might benefit the AfD is a democratic dead end.

Friedrich Merz returned to politics in 2020 after years in the financial sector. Yet, while Merkel once broke with Helmut Kohl, Merz has so far avoided a reckoning with the Merkel era. The current power dynamics within the CDU make such a move difficult. Merz leads a party that Merkel spent years reshaping. His reluctance to break decisively with her legacy makes him appear as a mere transitional figure. If the CDU fails to establish a clear strategic vision by the next federal election, the AfD will continue to gain ground. At that point, the CDU will be forced to reassess the firewall doctrine. Otherwise, Germany risks becoming politically ungovernable – or seeing the AfD emerge as the strongest party in the country.