The Ramadan Divide: How China and India Treat Islam

Some critics even go so far as to claim that both nations are engaged in policies resembling ethnic cleansing in regions with significant Muslim populations. While discriminatory policies do exist in practice, it would be too easy to look at the situation just through the lens of human rights or authoritarianism. In both China and India, the issue should be understood not primarily in terms of religious freedom or civil liberties but rather through the prisms of geopolitics, political philosophy, and state cohesion.

A Demographic and Geopolitical Liability?

The demographic and regional distribution of Muslim populations in China and India differ considerably, yet they lead to similar political conclusions: both governments perceive these communities as potential geopolitical vulnerabilities that could be exploited by external rivals.

In China, Muslims constitute between 1.45% and 2% of the total population, which translates to roughly 20.5 to 28.3 million people. For comparison, Catholics account for just 0.34% and Protestants for 2.19%. The primary concern is not their overall numbers but their geographic concentration. In most provinces, the Muslim population remains below 1%. However, two exceptions—Xinjiang (58%) and Qinghai (17.5%)—pose particular challenges. Xinjiang shares a porous border with Central Asia, while Qinghai is adjacent to Tibet, a region with a fraught history of separatist movements. Furthermore, these provinces are rich in critical resources, such as rare earth metals, essential for China’s industrial ambitions.

Beijing’s security calculus is shaped by an enduring historical anxiety: the fear of national fragmentation. This concern dates back to the Warring States period and has remained a central theme in Chinese statecraft. Any factor that threatens national unity is treated as an existential issue. In this context, foreign powers have attempted to exert influence in these regions, whether by invoking human rights concerns or, as in 2021, through the strategic disorder created by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

By contrast, India’s Muslim population is both significantly larger and more dispersed. Muslims constitute approximately 14% of the national population—around 172 million people—and exceed 10% in nearly every state. Certain regions, however, have markedly higher concentrations: West Bengal (27%), Assam (34%), and Jammu and Kashmir (68%). These figures, based on the 2011 census, may have shifted, but the lack of updated data complicates policy responses and fosters uncertainty in decision-making.

This situation creates two major challenges. The first concerns internal security: how to balance religious and ethnic pluralism while simultaneously promoting a nationalist political agenda. The second is geopolitical, centering on the protracted conflict over Kashmir and the broader strategic rivalry with Pakistan. These complexities are further exacerbated by India's federal structure, where the central government must assert authority over its provinces while navigating highly sensitive religious and ethnic issues. In this context, religious minorities can easily become political instruments for broader strategic aims.

Legislation as an Instrument of Control

Given these security concerns, both China and India have implemented legal frameworks that reflect their respective approaches to governance and national unity.

In China, the paramount concern is preserving state cohesion—a challenge exacerbated by the fragmentation that followed the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Islam, like all foreign religious influences, is subjected to Beijing’s longstanding practice of sinicization. Religious organizations must register with the government, and since 2016, all religious practices must align with the cultural and ideological tenets of the Communist Party. This policy has led to significant changes in religious rituals, architecture, and dress codes, particularly in Xinjiang, where mosques have been redesigned in Chinese architectural styles and Islamic beards have been banned. Moreover, imams must undergo state-approved training, pledge loyalty to the Communist Party, and promote state policies in their teachings. The "Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy," effective since May 2021, further codifies these requirements. Religious education for minors is also severely restricted, underscoring Beijing’s determination to suppress any alternative sources of political authority that could challenge the party’s monopoly on power.

India’s approach, while different in structure, similarly reflects concerns over national unity. As a federal system, India’s governance is shaped by complex interactions between the central and state governments. The country’s demographic heterogeneity is reflected in its legal framework, with more than 700 ethnic groups and a Hindu majority of 79.9%. The Constitution guarantees religious freedom under Articles 25 to 28, but it also envisions the eventual implementation of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) under Article 44, seeking to replace religious-based personal laws with a common legal framework.

In recent years, the Supreme Court and the central government have taken steps to enforce legal uniformity. In 2017, the Supreme Court declared instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) unconstitutional. This practice made it possible for the husband to divorce instantly as soon as he pronounced or wrote three times the word “talaq” (divorce). This was followed by the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act in 2019, which criminalized the practice. However, the broader UCC has not been implemented nationwide, with only one state—Uttarakhand—adopting it as of 2025. The new law in Uttarakhand unifies marriage, divorce, and inheritance laws while effectively banning practices such as polygamy.

A Common Strategic Imperative

While the specific policies and implementation mechanisms differ, China and India share a fundamental similarity in their treatment of religious and ethnic minorities: both view them through the lens of national security. The prevailing concern in both countries is not Islam itself, but rather the risk of alternative centers of political and social influence emerging within their borders. This perspective is often misunderstood in the West, where the discourse tends to center on religious freedom and human rights. For Beijing and New Delhi, however, the overarching priority is maintaining state cohesion and preempting any potential challenges to their respective national projects.

Statement

China and India approach their Muslim populations not through the lens of religious freedom, but as matters of state security. Beijing sees its concentrated Muslim communities in Xinjiang and Qinghai as potential fault lines for foreign interference and separatism. India, with its dispersed but sizable Muslim minority, navigates tensions between religious pluralism and nationalist politics. Both nations deploy legal mechanisms to assert control—China through sinicization and religious regulation, India through efforts to standardise personal laws. While the West oversimplifies this reality as a human rights issue, for China and India, it is a strategic necessity to maintain national cohesion.

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