Brazil and Argentina, the region's second and third largest trade partners, also contribute to trade imbalances, exporting $30 billion and $10 billion more in goods to the U.S., respectively, than they import. This imbalance is particularly evident in the agricultural sector, where U.S. exporters face significant competition.
Trump's administration will likely push for increased exports of grains and meats while targeting subsidies on Brazilian beef and Argentine soybeans, but such measures could provoke retaliatory actions, potentially souring relations with these key partners and further driving the region into the arms of rival blocs like BRICS, which already counts Brazil as one of its members.
2. Immigration and Security
Under Biden, asylum policies became more lenient, with the expiration of Title 42 expulsions of those who had recently been in countries with widespread infectious diseases, and the cessation of family separation practices, which previously deported parents but allowed their children to stay in U.S. territory.
In contrast, Trump plans to reinstate strict political and humanitarian asylum limits, expand the "Remain in Mexico" program, which required asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while their cases are being processed, and accelerate border wall construction to curb illegal crossings, which exceeded 2.3 million in 2023.
Trump also aims to combat drug cartels operating in Mexico and Central America and reduce the inflow of fentanyl and other narcotics, which are responsible for over 70,000 deaths through overdose annually in the U.S alone.
However, his unilateral demand for Mexico and other Central American governments to take more aggressive action controlling illegal immigration and drug trade, which if not met may mean imposing tariffs on at least the former, may alienate other regional partners, endangering cooperative security efforts.
3. Ideological Contention with Venezuela and Cuba
Trump’s second term will also revive his administration's hardline stance against the openly hostile socialist governments of Venezuela and Cuba, marking a sharp departure from Biden’s policy of cautious engagement.
Under Biden, sanctions on Venezuela partially eased up in exchange for promises that free and fair elections would be held—promises which Nicolás Maduro ultimately failed to fulfill. Similarly, Biden sought to restore limited diplomatic ties with Cuba, resuming visa processing and allowing remittances.
Trump is nonetheless expected to reinstate comprehensive sanctions on Venezuela, targeting Maduro’s inner circle, which is suspected of involvement in international drug trafficking. His administration most likely will also begin to openly support independent opposition leader María Corina Machado.
In Cuba, Trump will likely tighten restrictions on money transfers, travel, and business activities, reversing Biden’s efforts to re-establish diplomatic relations, a legacy from the Obama era.
These policies align with Trump’s broader ideological opposition to socialism but may isolate the U.S. from allies who favor engagement and dialogue, such as Canada and Germany, increasing the region’s potential for further polarization, reducing U.S. influence while reviving anti-American sentiment.
4. Relations with Milei and Bukele
Trump’s second term offers an opportunity to strengthen ties with ideologically aligned leaders like Argentina’s Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. Both leaders share Trump’s populist, anti-establishment rhetoric and disdain for traditional political elites. This alignment creates potential for cooperation on issues like deregulation, reducing government size, and opposing leftism.
Figures like Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, Trump’s prospective DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) appointees, have also expressed admiration for Milei’s economic policies, but differences remain, as Milei’s libertarian stance on social issues like abortion may conflict with Trump’s more conservative platform.
In El Salvador, Bukele’s tough-on-crime policies align with Trump’s emphasis on law and order (including a mutual wish to reduce illegal immigration from Central America), could strengthen ties, but his past Marxist leanings and willingness to engage with China for infrastructure investments complicate the relationship.
Trump’s brand of diplomacy openly prioritizes U.S. interests over ideological alignment, which could strain even these partnerships should disagreements emerge. A key challenge here will be navigating these differences without alienating potential allies in the region.
Conclusion: A Region of Challenges and Opportunities
As Donald Trump begins his second term, his foreign policy toward Latin America promises to be one marked by both continuity and change. Hardline stances on immigration and security will likely resonate domestically but could strain ties with Mexico and Central America, especially if measures are perceived as overly punitive. On trade, renegotiations and tariffs aimed at reducing regional trade deficits may protect U.S. industries but risk economic retaliation and the loss of influence to rival powers like China.
Trump’s ideological battles with Venezuela and Cuba are likely to undermine Biden’s efforts to bring about détente, while potential partnerships with fellow populist leaders like Milei and Bukele will test Trump’s ability to balance shared values with pragmatism.
Ultimately, the success of Trump’s Latin America strategy will depend on his administration’s ability to prioritize U.S. interests while fostering constructive partnerships.
This will depend on its ability to balance domestic priorities with the need for constructive partnerships, fostering regional stability and economic growth while advancing U.S. strategic interests in the region.
Whether it can strike that balance remains to be seen, but the stakes for both the U.S. and Latin America have never been higher.
