Trump’s most comprehensive statement on the question, his “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli Peoples,” published January 2020, proposed a two-state solution that is favourable to Israel, with a demilitarized Palestinian state, Israeli sovereignty over settlements in the West Bank beyond its internationally recognized borders, as well as its control over Gaza.
Judging by his rhetoric, Trump has maintained this line while on the campaign trail. He chose ambassadors to Israel (David Friedman and Mike Huckabee, who have both expressed support for settlements in the West Bank). Signalling a pivot away from Ukraine could also indicate a desire to free up resources should they be needed in the Middle East.
However, we may also identify moderating factors: Trump has signalled a reluctance to inherit the ongoing conflict, pressing Israel to conclude its military operations swiftly. He has also been critical of Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, a sentiment amplified by Trump's sharing of a video by economist Jeffrey Sachs on Truth Social, in which Sachs accused Netanyahu of manipulating American foreign policy, particularly in having pushed for the 2003 Iraq war and seeking further U.S. action against Iran. This may have been a way to appease his base, which is in some large part anti-interventionist, and to pressure Netanyahu to accept a Gaza ceasefire.
The recent announcement of a ceasefire in Gaza (reportedly aggressively negotiated for by Trump appointee Steve Witkoff) indicates this desire for de-escalation, though there have been similar ceasefires during previous presidential inaugurations (just before Obama’s inauguration January 2009, Operation Cast Lead reached a ceasefire). Indeed, in return for agreeing to de-escalation, which spares Trump any political fallout from Gaza during his first few weeks in office, Israel may receive concessions from Trump’s administration, perhaps in the form of a long-standing hawkish position on Iran. Yet, de-escalation in Gaza (even were it to last beyond the present ceasefire, which is unlikely) does not reduce the likelihood of conflict with Iran, which we will get to shortly.
Other considerations aside, we may expect Trump to push for a permanent settlement, as his principal objective is likely to renew the Abraham Accords and reverse the Middle East’s slide towards BRICS (including by strengthening the US vis-à-vis the China-led digital currency mBridge initiative). The region, after all, remains important both in terms of oil as well as in terms of global supply chains and trade routes. But in order to do this, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must de-escalate, as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States will struggle to sell normalization with Israel or alignment with the US to their population should it not.
The Turkish relationship with Israel is ambiguous. Turkey (which acted as the principal patron of HTS, both in its previous Idlib-enclave and during its rise to power), announced a freeze on trade until a permanent ceasefire in Gaza was reached. While the sale of fuel and military equipment was prohibited, some outlets have claimed military sales have, in fact, continued. A desire to help Israel in some capacity would of course further Turkey’s goal of degrading Iran, its regional rival.
The Erdoğan government’s rhetoric is more hostile to Jerusalem than its actions might suggest. Notably, President Erdoğan’s son, Bilal, has promoted the slogan "Önce Ayasofya, sonra Şam, sonra Kudüs” (First the Hagia Sophia, which was recently turned back into a mosque, then Damascus, which is now in HTS control, then Jerusalem, indicating some future designs upon the state of Israel). Whether this represents mere neo-Ottoman propaganda, or a genuine long-term desire to take the place of Iran as regional hegemon, remains to be seen. Were Turkey to occupy this role, its version of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” would be more Sunni than Shia, drawing on a large population, and would benefit from a stronger economy and a more powerful military than Iran’s.
This is a longer-term concern, however, and so far as his tenure is concerned, Trump’s focus will likely be to seek a balance of powers that accommodates Turkey. In the past, he has conceded to Turkey’s regional interests, allowing Erdoğan to engage Kurdish forces, notably in October of 2019, during “Operation Peace Spring” in northeastern Syria, a direct result of Trump’s decision to withdraw from the border area. This despite the semi-autonomous Kurdish political entity at Rojava counting on U.S. support, including, at one point, as a bulwark against ISIS.
Trump later condemned Turkish actions and issued an executive order imposing sanctions on Turkish officials, as well as raising tariffs on steel. Turkey accepted a ceasefire with the Kurdish authority, brokered by Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo soon after, however.
Trump’s record, therefore, is generally not hostile to Turkey, who he may now see as a partner in the pushback against Iran.
Turning to Iran, Trump's own record is one of aggressive containment. This was marked by the US’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA (the Iran Nuclear Deal) announced in May 2018, placing sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports, financial transactions, shipping and key industries, the “Maximum Pressure” campaign, including efforts at diplomatic isolation, and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization in April 2019. We may also highlight the January 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani and airstrikes on Syria and Iraq, as well as cyber-attacks on Iranian military sites during the Trump administration.
Taking a hard-line on Iran seems likely given how it pulls together other objectives: it represents a key element of continued support for Israel, it is compatible with a policy of alignment with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, especially in terms of countering BRICS and Chinese influence in a key strategic theatre, and it enhances Turkey’s position as regional actor.
Whether this grows into a more volatile game of tit-for-tat, requiring an uptick in U.S. presence in the Middle East, depends on Iran, which has generally shown itself to be risk-averse regarding its policy towards Israel, and unlikely to adopt a different approach to a White House occupied by Trump.
