The Musk factor and China-US relations

In the West, the predominant opinion is that these relations will be marked by friction as the two countries will fall in what the American political scientist Graham Allison called the “Thucydides trap”: a situation in which a dominant but declining hegemon fears displacement by an ascending power, which heightens the risk of open conflict between the two . In all previous transitions of power known in history, only one occurred peacefully: when the U.S. took over from the UK after WWI; Such a peaceful transition was made possible by the shared culture and ideology, something that does not exist between the US and China at the moment.

Those arguing that China and the U.S. are destined for war base their prediction on the same interpretation of the realist school of thought: the anarchical system forces countries to behave self-interested . Such a way of thinking, based on positivisms, ignore human nature, political philosophy as well as cultural differences. In other words, the common understanding of China-U.S. relations ignores the very elements that make China, China and the U.S., the US. Political scientists like Barry Buzan and Martin Wight have decried the use of such a reductionist approach in 1977, their voices left unheeded . Perhaps the time has come to listen.

What would be reasons for believing that U.S.-China relations, in the context of the new Trump era, would not be marked by conflict ? It is true that Trump’s first term was in fact marked by an extensive trade war with China and the strengthening of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea to challenge China’s territorial claims. But this time the context of the second Trump’s term is very different. First, Trump is far from an ideologue . That means that China is not an adversary for him by definition (it might be or not, depending on context), an approach most dissimilar from a D emocrat-led administration that views the world through a moral prism, on which foreign policy in large part has been based since the XIXth century and which, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, had been given further ideological backing by Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man.

If China is an empire, its political philosophy is very different from the Western imperial mindset. Any Western empire (the U.S. very much behaved like one since Theodore Roosevelt) has as its core tenet the need to expand so as to spread “civilization”. Chinese imperial mentality is different and best exemplified by the concept of Tianxia (all under heaven): The Chinese Empire did not come through Chinese expansion but by other cultures coming into contact with it. Chinese elites see the world as the coexistence of various regional orders under the influence of a regional hegemon (with Asia falling of course under the dominion of China). While this understanding results in affirmative policies in Asia, it also entails a complete absence of political or military inference in other regions. Instead, its imperative is to connect other regions with the Chinese economy . That is the role played by the Belt and Road initiative (nicknamed the “new silk roads”) which acts as a way of linking any regional development initiative to China, making it the centre of globalization . China is foremost concerned with its status, its economy and with wanting to avoid a repeat of its century of humiliation , not with ideological inference and conquest.

Such logic seems to be shared by Donald Trump. The same way that China wants to assert its position in its region, so does Trump. The attempt to purchase Greenland, to annex Canada and to rename the Gulf of Mexico the Gulf of America are clear signs of a regionalized understanding of world order. Such geopolitical views are compatible as they de facto exclude any inference in another regional hegemon’s sphere.

Another argument in favor of U.S.-China relations being stable under Trump is the importance of the individual in Chinese political thought and in the upcoming Trump’s administration political practice. In Chinese political thought, the key political notion is the one of “responsibility” derived from Confucianism. The government’s role is to pursue a moral agenda of virtues (not pursuing power for one’s selfish purpose), which gives rise to a natural order of social harmony rooted in good education. This is now known under the concept of “moral realism” coined by the prominent Tsinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong. The idea of human authority based on moral behaviour is radically opposed to the western idea of hegemony that proceeds from military power. In moral realism, the key point is political power, which is is the ability of the government to govern and command respect—and thus garner influence—through moral acts and statements . Here, not just the competence of the head of state is important but also of his advisors (hence the anti-corruption policies that are designed not just to get rid of political opponents , but also to ensure no CCP officials would develop behaviours damaging the Party’s image).

Meanwhile, as for the U.S. it seems that under the new Trump administration there is room for a growing importance of personal relations In this case, what would constitute the bulk of U.S. foreign policy would not involve mere state interests but the personal interests of Trump and of his administration. The argument is a credible one, as evinced by the European politicians who had been personally invited to Inauguration Day as well as by the announcement of the launch of Trump’s crypto-currency that will de facto challenge the State’s currency (the USD). While such a practice is philosophically the opposite of moral realism, the result is the same: the individual matters. Speaking of the individual, there is one that matters even more to both China and the U.S., and could facilitate either good or strained relations: Elon Musk.

Musk owes a lot to China. If Tesla financially survived, it is because of the important Chinese investments and the Chinese government’s authorization to build a mega factory in Shanghai in 2020. This process brought millions of USD worth of investments in the Chinese economy and allowed Musk to gain access to Chinese leadership in Shanghai, especially Li Qiang, who was then the CCP secretary of Shanghai and is now China’s Premier and trusted advisor of President Xi Jinping. Musk has on many occasions praised China’s economic market and has even called U.S. workers “lazy” (5/11/2024) when comparing them to these . Musk is treading carefully though, since while he supports China he has publicly stated that Chinese carmakers BYD and SAIC had the potential to « pretty much demolish most of other car companies on the world » (14/06/2024)— a statement which serves to keep American workers from feeling alienated . Indeed, Musk and China are economically interdependent: when China’s economy slows , Tesla’s market value decreases. Furthermore, Musk has publicly adopted very meaningful and strong positions in favor of China. For example, he is in favor of the “one China policy” (the ending of China’s civil war by reunion with the island of Taiwan ), which in turn made Taipei announce in September 2023 that it would develop an alternative to Starlink. Finally, Tesla has been investing massively in Xinjiang and Tibet, two provinces of China which because of its repressive policies there has garnered it criticism by the West .

In China , the media don’t hesitate to qualify the relationship with Tesla and Musk to be a “win-win cooperation”. Tesla’s presence in China is very important economically, but especially symbolically: it shows that China is open and safe for foreign investments, at a time when increasing foreign investments in China is a priority. Since Trump’s election, it is even more important given the relation to Trump and the importance of Musk in his victory and future administration. Positive relations with Musk are illustrated by the fact that Tesla is included in the buying catalogue of CCP and State officials . In other words, western Tesla cars can now (since July 2024) be used as official vehicles for the Chinese elite, an honour so far only granted to Volvo (a western product), though it had been bought by Zhejiang Greely Holding in 2010.

Given these relations, China is capitalizing on Musk to gain influence in the U.S., or at least, to have leverage on some of the U.S.’ decisions, such as the likely ban of TikTok. Musk has argued that banning TikTok was a mistake and China counts on him to revert the process. The questions are: would this work and what would be the price to pay ? As such, Musk could find himself in a position that only two Americans had before him : journalist Edgar Sow, who was very close to Mao, and Henry Kissinger who successfully built a strong relation with Zhou Enlai and was the architect of rapprochement between the two countries in 1972.

If Musk can play a role in favour of peaceful U.S.-China relations, he can also be a trigger for conflict . The first variable to have in mind is to what extent Trump and Musk will get along in the long term? Then, Musk's activities are not all in favour of China. In Chinese strategy, protection against foreign inference and against destabilisation is key. Such policy has been an important Western (especially U.S.) practice in Eastern Europe and in the Caucasus since 2000.

That is why China is devoting a lot of resources to protect its physical and digital space from foreign influence. The Grand firewall is very effective, but it could soon face a threat: the availability of Starlink, which would allow any Chinese citizen to have free internet access not under control of the Chinese state. To counter this threat, China is building up alternatives and therefore rivals, to Starlink and plans to deploy 38.000 satellites in low orbit (against the planned 40.000 of Starlink) not just for domestic use, but to offer an alternative to Western internet access to those countries already benefiting from the Belt and road initiative.

In the Tiktok affair, one option suggested by Bloomberg would be to sell TikTok to Musk. Other options could be a relaxing of Chinese policy concerning the transfer of ownership of tech businesses in favor of Tesla, or allowing Starlink to operate in China under strict conditions . These options seem unlikely as the sale would grant Musk access to China’s digital space , something identified as a red line by China. In return, the connection that Musk has with China could be seen as a liability for U.S. security, especially if the personal relationship between Musk and Trump deteriorates.

No matter how China-U.S. relations might evolve, what seems to be one factor to keep in mind is that the primacy of the individual has made its return.

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