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The Visegrad Group: A Geopolitical Battleground between China and Taiwan

The Visegrad Group: A Geopolitical Battleground between China and Taiwan

Eastern and Central Europe has long been a zone of intense great-power competition. In the 19th century, the region was shaped by the German Empire’s concept of Mitteleuropa; during the Cold War, it was a battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Today, the Visegrad Group (V4) finds itself at the centre of a new geopolitical rivalry, this time between the Western bloc, led by the U.S. and the EU, and the expanding BRICS+ alliance, primarily composed of Russia and China. One of the defining political developments of recent decades has been the gradual eastward expansion of the European Union, with Central European nations joining in parallel with the development of EU institutions and norms.

The competition between great powers has once again intensified in Central Europe, a shift precipitated by the COVID-19 crisis. As countries scrambled to secure vaccines and medical supplies, a clear geopolitical divide emerged: the EU's vaccine rollout versus Chinese and Russian alternatives. Since 2013, China has sought to increase its influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, leveraging its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to enhance economic connectivity and to gain political leverage, particularly within EU institutions. The war in Ukraine has further exacerbated this competition, as Chinese investments in the region grow, alongside trade disputes—especially concerning electric vehicles.

The Chinese Strategy: A Multifaceted Approach

China's strategy for gaining influence in Eastern Europe, particularly through the Visegrad Group, is multi-dimensional. At its core lies a discursive element. Chinese political communication emphasises the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, “Harmonious World”, “Peaceful Rise”, and “Peaceful Development”. These principles promote ideas of non-interference, mutual economic development, and pluralism, arguing that economic advancement should not be conditional upon political reforms, such as those advocated by the West—namely, human rights and liberal democracy. Instead, China asserts that every country should have access to development, irrespective of its domestic political system, as enshrined in the UN Charter.

This rhetoric, which underpins Chinese investment in the region, stands in stark contrast to the EU’s approach, which often ties economic aid to political change. A case in point is Serbia, which in 2023 signed a free trade agreement with China while maintaining a vague stance on its EU aspirations. The EU, in turn, has developed a clear narrative: countries must choose between the BRICS and the EU’s economic architecture.

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