Pipeline Politics: The Visegrád Gamble in Post-Conflict Energy Security

Two important pipelines, the Yamal and Druzhba, rely on the V4 countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) to bring Russian gas into the EU, affording these countries the chance to play an active role in normalising Europe's relations with Moscow.

War Changes Matters

After the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian gas imports declined sharply, and the EU has been focusing on diversification. However, de-escalation in Ukraine is probable, given President Trump’s repeated signalling that he wants to see the conflict ended. For its part, the EU cannot materially support Ukrainian operations on its own, and the political will to do so has waned.

Concerning the V4’s strategic position in the face of this, the question is whether, as a consequence of their geographic position, they can push for increased Russian imports, which in turn would increase their transit revenue, and assume the role of mediators (something Hungarian PM Viktor Orban has already leaned into). Their ability to lobby, of course, depends on how cohesive they are, that is, whether they can act as a bloc to exert pressure.

The present Polish government's geopolitical outlook poses a limitation in this regard, as Prime Minister Donald Tusk is generally aligned with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s position and is favourable to maintaining sanctions on Russia. And yet, Poland is particularly important, given that both the Yamal and northern branch of the Druzhba pipelines pass through the country. Therefore, much depends on the 2025 Polish presidential election, and the stance a future head of state takes on Moscow and its V4 partners.

Headaches over Energy

One factor which may pressure the EU to return to the importation of Russian gas via V4 countries is the fact that European attempts at energy diversification have not gone smoothly. Increasing renewable energy production has met with only moderate success. In particular, we have seen how integrating “green” sources into an existing power grid too hastily can result in extreme energy price volatility, as occurred in Germany during the last months of 2024, with severe electricity price fluctuations (an ongoing investigation will now determine whether these 2024 fluctuations were accompanied by deliberate market manipulation.)

Such cases cast doubts on the short and medium-term viability of the Commission's Green Transition, against which Europe has already seen some political backlash (including from Italian PM Giorgia Meloni and chairman of the Dutch right-wing PVV party Geert Wilders). Of course, significant investment in renewables has been made, and these will be part of the European energy mix going forward, but not as prominently or as quickly as had been thought.

However, renewable energy is not the only alternative to a return to (Russian-heavy) fossil fuel imports. The extent to which the EU might return to Russian energy sources also depends on global energy market dynamics, new LNG (liquified natural gas) projects (with imports coming mainly from the U.S. and Norway), and the ongoing development of the Southern Gas Corridor, as well as the viability of the EU’s renewable energy infrastructure going forward.

A Hegemonic Turkey

Another ongoing development that might reduce the need for Russian energy is the prospect of Turkish hegemony in an energy rich region. The TurkStream has served to reroute Russian gas into Europe: Hungary remains heavily reliant on Russian gas, importing approximately 7.5 billion cubic meters annually via the pipeline while also negotiating to maintain the Ukrainian transit route (Ukraine having refused to extend the agreement beyond 2024). But beyond this, Turkey is key to the Southern Gas Corridor, which transports gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia and into Europe via Greece, Albania, and Italy, by-passing the V4 altogether.

In addition, following Turkey’s increased influence over Syria, given the replacement of Bashar al-Assad by a largely Turkey-sponsored HTS-led government in Damascus, it may serve as a conveyor of energy from the Near East into Europe. Consistent with this vision, Turkey has stated that it intends to invest in Syria's energy and electricity sectors and improve security around energy infrastructure as well as in general in the country. Syria has been a significant oil exporter and could see initiatives to resume oil and gas production under Turkish patronage, particularly if stability is achieved.

Before the Syrian civil war, there were plans to build an Arab Gas Pipeline, which would transport Egyptian gas through Syria to Turkey and then to Europe. Turkey's influence may now lead to reviving the project. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) could also be connected to Syrian infrastructure to the same end.

To the degree that Turkish routes can be pivoted towards the V4, they would run through Hungary. This would grow the V4’s strategic importance to European energy security beyond their relations with Russia. Both an Arab Gas Pipeline and extended TANAP could include Hungary as a major distribution node into Eastern and Northern Europe. Indeed, this strategy is viable given Hungary’s long-term good relations with Turkey, and would represent a shift in the V4 from the centrality of Poland as one key, but unwilling, hub for the Yamal and Druzhba pipelines, to Hungary.

No Such Thing as Permanence

Such a project, however, hinges on Syrian stability, which is by no means guaranteed, and would contend with elements in the EU unwilling to favour Hungary in this way, given Orban’s tense relations with the Commission. Indeed, von der Leyen has arguably shown herself willing to sacrifice purchasing power to maintain sanctions on Russia, and will likely maintain a similar position towards Hungary.

Nor is the U.S. necessarily an ally to the V4 or Hungary in this area. The global shift towards LNG, U.S. shale gas, and other alternative sources might further diversify EU energy options, reducing the urgency to return to Russian supplies or develop Turkish routes. Even if de-escalation in Ukraine is sought by the Trump White House, Washington will continue to want to sell energy to Europe.

Although we may expect economic benefits for the V4 as Russian energy imports into Europe increase, therefore, this situation is unlikely to be permanent, or to be accompanied by long-term influence over energy policy.

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