Both countries viewed EU accession in 2004 as a pathway to prosperity. Referenda reflected overwhelming support, as 77.3% in Czechia and 92.5% in Slovakia voted in favour. Slovaks, in particular, believed EU membership would solve their domestic problems, especially corruption. Accession was seen as a safeguard against these issues. Once both countries became member states, however, the benchmarks for success changed.

For years, progress was measured by the degree of EU integration. The adoption of the Euro in 2009 was heralded as a major achievement. Yet, the anticipated economic boom failed to materialise.

A Divided Slovakia

Disillusionment with the EU in Slovakia was only a matter of time. From 2010 to 2018, Robert Fico’s social democratic government, despite championing EU integration, was marred by corruption scandals and cronyism. His third term ended amid the fallout from the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak. Afterwards, Slovakia was briefly led by President Peter Pellegrini.

Having lost the 2020 elections, Fico became part of the opposition. Meanwhile, with strong media backing, pro-European politician Zuzana Čaputová became president in 2019. However, the governing coalition that emerged from the 2020 elections struggled to manage the COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated public dissatisfaction and polarisation.

In 2023, Fico made a comeback. His campaign focused on opposing ”woke” culture, cutting aid to Ukraine, and embracing Euroskepticism. His main opponent, Michal Šimečka of Progressive Slovakia, took the opposite view. Subsequently, the country was split into two irreconcilable camps, leaving no room for compromise.

Unlike those in other European nations, Slovak politicians no longer even attempt to bridge societal divides. The only common denominator is animosity toward the opposing political faction. As a result, the middle ground has disappeared.

The Czech Approach

While Slovakia was plunged into polarisation, Czechia has remained pragmatic. The Czech mentality, epitomised by the fictional character Švejk’s exaggerated servility, has historically enabled it to survive under any regime. This pragmatism extends to the country’s stance on the EU.

Prime Minister Petr Fiala, originally a critic of Eurofederalism, pivoted upon taking office in 2022, steering Czechia toward stronger European integration. He endorsed military aid for Ukraine and addressed the energy crisis by securing liquefied natural gas imports. Unlike Slovakia’s pro-European politicians, however, Fiala presents European integration as beneficial to Czech interests rather than as an ideological commitment. The reality, however, is that the framing of EU policies as being advantageous for Czechia is becoming increasingly difficult.

Although Czech society faces polarisation, it is less susceptible to radicalisation. Czechs value comfort and humor, making alarmist politicians warning of impending catastrophes less persuasive. Revolutionary visions—whether of a future in Brussels or Moscow—appeal only to a minority. Its stability is further underpinned by a strong lower-middle class. If radicalisation occurs, it will likely stem from an economic crisis rather than ideological strife.

If Not From Within, Then From Outside

Czechia could still be drawn into Slovakia’s domestic turmoil, which has become a key argument for Czech pro-European politicians. They see Slovakia’s trajectory as a consequence of Fico’s pro-Russian stance and blame Moscow for the country’s societal fractures. This perspective, however, oversimplifies reality.

When Slovakia joined the EU in 2004, it was one of the most pro-integration countries. According to regular Eurobaremeter surveys, it had a very high level of trust in the EU for the first ten years, with confidence levels between 60% and 70%. Then, in the following years, trust in the EU began to decline rapidly, falling to 37% in 2021. The latest figures show that trust has risen slightly, reaching 53% in 2024. However, this rise is an expression of dissatisfaction with the Fico government.

Two decades on, the picture is a rather different one. Slovak disenchantment with the EU was not orchestrated by Vladimir Putin but arose from within, as the Union evolved from a project of cooperation into a regulatory body interfering in nearly all aspects of life.

Warnings about a potential ”Slovak path” do not imply a return to old geopolitical alignments. Rather, they acknowledge that EU membership does not automatically resolve economic challenges. Instead of introspection, pro-European politicians seek external scapegoats, failing to recognise their own missteps.

Fico, for his part, has demanded that Czechia refrain from interfering in Slovakia’s affairs, asserting that no country has the right to dictate Slovakia’s policies. While his call for respect for sovereignty is legitimate, he cannot prevent Czech politicians or media from commenting on the situation.

Fico is right that Slovakia’s decisions are ultimately a matter for Slovak voters. Czechia must respect Slovakia’s sovereignty. However, Fico cannot stop Czech journalists, artists, or politicians from expressing opinions that, in turn, influence public discourse. The question remains: what coercive measures could Fico employ to silence Czech voices? Unless he presents concrete evidence of Czech interference, his accusations will remain rhetorical. If he escalates the matter, Czech-Slovak relations could cool.

The Future of Relations

The current tensions between Prague and Bratislava did not emerge organically but were artificially created. Czechia and Slovakia are bound not only by history but also by familial ties. In the 1980s, mixed marriages accounted for 15–20% of all unions; today, Czech-Slovak marriages constitute about a third of all mixed marriages in Czechia. Rebuilding Czech-Slovak relations will however require more than nostalgia

Friendships are easily destroyed but take generations to rebuild. The key factor will be the resolution—which may soon come with Donald Trump’s return to the White House—of the war in Ukraine. Most crucially, it will depend on whether leaders on both sides will emerge who recognise the value of strong neighborly relations. Unlike individuals, states cannot simply pack up and leave.