After ten years, it can be said that although political leadership has changed in all Visegrád countries except Hungary, the political and societal consensus on rejecting mass migration from Africa and the Middle East remains intact. The reasons for this are several. Historically, the countries of Central Europe have faced strong linguistic pressure coming from German-speaking powers or Russia, which politically dominated the region. In the case of Slovakia, this pressure came from Hungary, which itself suffered anxiety over the Germanisation of its elites during the Habsburg monarchy.This has fostered a deep-rooted sense of national vulnerability and a strong emphasis on ethnic and linguistic identity across all states in the region.
Beyond this historical explanation, resistance to mass migration can also be seen as a legitimate effort to avoid its proven downsides as observed in Germany by the citizens of the Visegrád countries.Germany has always been the gateway to the West for Central and Eastern Europe. During communism, West Germany and Austria represented ideals of prosperity and freedom and were the most common emigration destinations. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, they were the first points of contact with a then idealised West. Today, Germany shapes the Visegrád societies’ perception regarding mass migration.
This perspective on mass migration is too limited however, as there is not just one type of mass migration, but many. What it ends up looking like depends greatly on the cultural and political characteristics of the host country as these interact with those of particular immigrant communities. The effects of mass migration in Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, the Russian Federation or the United States, are highly distinct in each country. Every mass migration inevitably brings problems and challenges. However, the one currently seen in Germany, and more broadly in Western Europe, is arguably the least successful. Economically, it brings significant costs with precious few tangible benefits, while bringing crime and increased cultural tensions. Given this reality, it is unrealistic to expect a significant shift in the Visegrád countries’ approach to the issue. For instance, we can observe the very strict approach of Poland’s current liberal government under Donald Tusk in securing the eastern border with Belarus.
There is another side to this coin however. All four countries are currently experiencing a demographic crisis with no prospect of improvement. The workforce is increasingly composed of generations born after the fall of communism (and which are fewer in number), while the number of pensioners is growing; as a result companies across the region report acute labor shortages. Fertility rates remain very low, ensuring the problem’s continuation in the future.
In the case of Hungary and Slovakia, there is also the persistent emigration of young people.
As a result, migration is quietly becoming part and parcel of living in the region. For years, among EU member states, Poland has ranked first in terms of residence permits issued to non-EU migrants. In recent years, this trend saw an increase in Hungary as well. Compared to migration to Western Europe, there are however several significant differences.
First, the vast majority of migration to the Visegrád countries is legal. Secondly, most migrants come from culturally and ethnically similar countries. Except for Hungary, immigrants mainly come from other Eastern European countries, particularly Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Serbia, and, in the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia. It is however true that migration from non-European countries, especially from the Philippines, Vietnam, and India, has been on the rise in recent years.
However, there is a clear effort to avoid immigration from those countries whose populations have proven to be the most problematic for Western Europe. Migration flows are also predominantly job-related. Compared to Western European countries, there is a significantly lower proportion of migration for family reunification or asylum protection (the wave of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine excepted).
Residence permits are frequently issued in collaboration with employers for the purpose of filling specific job vacancies, mostly in the industrial sector. Work migration is also often perceived as a temporary matter. Apart from the already mentioned invasion of Ukraine—which, due to its geographical proximity and cultural similarity, was unique in driving more migration from there,— idealism is not top of mind for the region’s inhabitants.
The future remains uncertain. Germany’s approach, which relies on continuous immigration to replenish its population, is unlikely to see adoption by the region. However, the region is not Japan either—a culturally homogenous island nation (which by virtue of it being an island nation is more isolated from other cultures) that has been preparing itself for population decline for decades economically by outsourcing much of its labor-intensive industries.
While ethnic homogeneity is a treasured good in the region, its populations are also used to and hungry for economic growth. The smarter approach then would be allowing selective migration from culturally compatible countries—that way, the workforce sees a boost, social systems are maintained, and cultural tensions kept low.
