Judging by the programs of the forming coalition and the statements of its representatives in recent months, one might expect a political earthquake. The SPD, represented in the European Parliament in the German AfD’s faction, has long advocated a referendum on withdrawing from the EU and NATO and rejects sanctions against Russia.

The Motorists do not go that far, but they have little love for Brussels—their political identity is built on rejecting the Green Deal and the entire Brussels bureaucracy. On the other hand, they value good relations with the United States and view President Trump as their hero. In the European Parliament, they sit with Orbán and Le Pen in the Patriots for Europe group.

Babiš’s post-election maneuvering

Babiš’s ANO movement is also part of the Patriots group, but Babiš himself is much more moderate than his European partners—and also more restrained than his prospective coalition partners. He is known for making bold statements that he later retracts or contradicts through his own actions.

He is a sharp critic of the Green Deal, yet, as prime minister, he voted for it in Brussels. During the election campaign, he first invited President Zeman to appear with him publicly, then canceled the invitation—likely on the advice of his marketing strategists. He admires Orbán but showed no interest last year in being photographed with him.

Despite his criticism of Brussels and, occasionally, Washington, he insists that he will not change foreign policy. He wants to be the voice of the discontented people—while remaining a respected guest in European salons.

His post-election maneuvers reflect this approach. He repeatedly criticized the Czech initiative of appointing an international coordinator for ammunition deliveries to Ukraine. Today, however, he takes a much more moderate stance toward this flagship project of President Pavel, not questioning its purpose but pointing to the disproportionately high costs relative to the results achieved.

It is understandable that he does not want to provoke the president unnecessarily—the same president from whom he needs to receive authorization to form the government, and who has made it clear to both the SPD and the Motorists that he will not allow any questioning of Czech membership in NATO or the EU. While the constitution does not explicitly empower the president to block the government for these reasons, he can certainly complicate its formation.

Not only Babiš acts pragmatically

Babiš is not the only pragmatist in the planned coalition. Both the Motorists and the SPD are eager to take part in governing—and are willing to make some compromises to do so. The Motorists are eyeing the post of foreign minister, which could go to their prominent figure, Filip Turek. In his year in the European Parliament, he gained some exposure to foreign policy, but otherwise has few qualifications for the position.

Still, as in Babiš’s previous government and in Fiala’s, the position of foreign minister has typically gone to secondary politicians, while the direction of foreign policy is set by the prime minister and the president. The current minister, Jan Lipavský, used his ministry primarily for communications and PR, which ultimately earned him second place in preference votes in the recent elections—right behind the victorious Babiš.

It remains to be seen whether Turek will follow the same path or—if he has little real influence on foreign policy—at least attempt to stop the financial flows that channel hundreds of millions of crowns from the Foreign Ministry to various non-governmental organizations, which the Motorists strongly oppose.

Modest progress within the framework of the law

Participation in government would represent a major step forward for the SPD. The contradiction between its radical program and what will actually be possible in a Babiš government is resolved by the SPD’s decision not to nominate its top political figures but instead friendly experts. Okamura himself is aiming for the post of Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. However, he will likely appoint two ministers from his party’s ranks. Even if one of these portfolios is defense, no radical steps are expected there.

The new government will likely try to improve relations with Slovakia, which the Fiala government had damaged through condescension and by canceling high-level meetings. Similarly, Babiš is expected to take a pragmatic approach toward Orbán, with whom he had good relations as prime minister.

The new government will approach Ukraine pragmatically and without ideological fervor, while taking care not to create unnecessary problems for itself in Brussels. Moderate progress within the bounds of the law. Given the current balance of political forces in the Czech Republic, nothing more is realistically possible.