‘During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, the United States fired approximately 150 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles – about a quarter of the entire stockpile ever purchased by the Pentagon,’ reads one of the latest analyses by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Another CSIS study estimates that in the first week of the current conflict alone, the United States used 158 THAAD missiles and 139 Patriot systems – nearly a tenth of its stockpile of roughly 1,600 to 1,800.
Production remains limited. Lockheed Martin produces around 600 Patriot missiles and 96 THAAD systems annually. Even with plans to increase output severalfold, such expansion would take years.
Ukraine and Taiwan both rely on Patriot systems, as do several Arab states. Early estimates from Ukrainian officials suggested that Gulf countries may have used around 800 missiles – a figure described by The Economist as ‘plausible’.
The campaign has also involved extensive use of Tomahawk missiles, a staple of US naval operations.
All three systems would be critical in any defence of Taiwan. The conflict in the Middle East is therefore not only tying down personnel, fleets and aircraft, but also rapidly depleting vital munitions.
The consequences are already becoming apparent. The US Department of Defense is reportedly considering diverting weapons supplies from Ukraine to the Middle East. Such a move would also affect the NATO-backed Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), which enables partner countries to finance US arms purchases for Kyiv.
A Precedent in the Making
The war also creates a broader strategic precedent. Other powers may cite it as justification for their own actions.
The United States has previously acted without an international mandate – in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s campaign in Gaza offer further examples. Iran now adds another case that could be invoked in future conflicts.
For China, the legal argument is more straightforward. Taiwan functions as a de facto independent democracy with its own government and institutions, yet it is not widely recognised as a sovereign state. Most countries adhere formally to the one-China policy while maintaining deliberately ambiguous diplomatic language.
China Appears in No Hurry
Recent developments might appear to favour action. Yet US intelligence assessments suggest otherwise. According to recent reports, Beijing is not currently planning an invasion of Taiwan and has no fixed timetable for achieving unification.
The Wall Street Journal notes that this marks a shift from earlier warnings that China might seek control of the island by 2027.
‘China’s leaders are not currently planning an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a firm timetable for achieving unification,’ states the latest annual assessment, dated 18 March.
Constraints on Beijing
Although the latest US intelligence assessment may appear reassuring, it says little about how the war with Iran could reshape the strategic balance in any future conflict over Taiwan.
At first glance, Washington’s entanglement in the Middle East might seem to offer Beijing an opportunity. Yet there are strong reasons to believe that China is in no hurry to act.
The decisive factor is not short-term advantage but time. From Beijing’s perspective, the strategic environment is gradually shifting in its favour. A military confrontation over Taiwan would carry significant risks while offering few benefits that could not be achieved through patience.
Economic considerations reinforce that caution. Even a swift takeover would almost certainly trigger Western sanctions, with serious consequences for China’s export-driven economy. A prolonged conflict would be more damaging still.
Energy security adds another constraint. China depends heavily on imports from the Gulf, and any disruption to shipping routes would expose a clear vulnerability. In a direct confrontation, the United States could seek to exploit that dependence.
The broader logic, however, remains unchanged. Beijing does not need to act under pressure. On the contrary, it can afford to wait.
As analyst Robert Wu argues, China’s leadership continues to prioritise peaceful reunification and is unlikely to act until it can be confident of overwhelming superiority. In his view, Beijing will avoid a military move unless it can ensure a decisive outcome and deter any external intervention.
In that sense, the rapid pace of Chinese military modernisation serves a dual purpose: it serves both to prepare for conflict and to deter it. Wu invokes Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: ‘Subduing an enemy army without a fight is the height of perfection.’
That principle may ultimately define Beijing’s approach.
Learning from Recent Conflicts
Moreover, Chinese leaders are likely to draw lessons from recent conflicts. Any move against Taiwan would not necessarily resemble the air campaign against Iran or Russia’s initial assault on Ukraine.
Instead, it could take a more gradual form. Rather than a direct attack, pressure could be applied incrementally, below the threshold of open war.
Donald Trump’s policy towards Cuba offers a possible model. By tightening restrictions on energy supplies and maritime access, Washington has been able to exert significant pressure without resorting to direct military action.
A similar approach could be applied to Taiwan. Brahma Chellaney, professor emeritus of strategic studies and a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, argues that China could pursue such a strategy under the guise of law enforcement.
‘Instead of firing missiles at Taipei or attacking Taiwanese beaches, China could declare a naval quarantine or a customs inspection regime around the island.’
Even limited inspections of shipping could disrupt supplies. Taiwan depends heavily on imported energy and maintains only minimal reserves.
‘A phased approach is key. A single dramatic act would shake the international system and force others to respond. But a gradual increase in “routine” ship inspections (…) does not offer such a shocking moment. Each step appears insufficient to justify a significant military response.’
Consequently, he argues that China could wait until a crisis of its own making becomes severe enough to justify further action, presenting any move as a stabilising response rather than an act of aggression.
