The OLG, which was responsible for his admission, obtained information from the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution as well as an extract from the register of associations. It subsequently concluded that the applicant did not meet the required minimum standard of constitutional loyalty.

The Saxon Constitutional Court took a different view. It argued that the state effectively holds a monopoly over this form of professional training. Without completing the traineeship, there is no route to full legal qualification. That in turn prevents a person from serving as a judge or working as a lawyer or public prosecutor.

The court therefore held that this preliminary stage of training should not be subject to stricter political admission requirements than those that later apply to practicing as a lawyer. The Federal Lawyers’ Act still allows exclusion only where opposition to the democratic order amounts to a criminal offense.

Conflicting Rulings

The Federal Administrative Court took the opposite view in a Bavarian case in 2024. It ruled that even legal trainees who are not civil servants must demonstrate a minimum degree of constitutional loyalty.

Anyone actively working against the free democratic basic order may therefore be excluded even without a criminal conviction.

On 14 July 2026, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint challenging the provisional admission of the applicant in the Saxon case because the objections raised had not been sufficiently set out or substantiated.

In particular, the court found that the Higher Administrative Court had indeed taken note of the contrary ruling by the Federal Administrative Court but continued to regard itself as bound by Saxon constitutional case law.

There is therefore still no definitive ruling from Germany’s highest courts on whether a criminal offense is required before admission to a legal traineeship can be refused.

Law Changed in April

Saxony amended the law governing admission to legal traineeships with effect from 1 April 2026. Until 31 March 2026, admission could generally be refused if an applicant, in the wording of the previous provision, “combats the free democratic basic order in a manner punishable by law”.

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In principle, this meant that there had to be a final conviction for a criminal offense before an applicant could be denied admission. Radical or anti-constitutional political activity that fell below the threshold of criminal conduct was not sufficient.

Since 1 April, the provision has been considerably broader. Admission must now generally be refused if an applicant “acts against the free democratic basic order”.

Under the new wording, a criminal offense is no longer required. The provision is intended to cover active conduct hostile to the constitutional order even where that conduct is lawful. The same rule may in principle also lead to the dismissal of a trainee who has already been admitted if relevant circumstances subsequently arise or come to light.

What the New Rules Cover

Exclusion therefore no longer depends on a conviction for incitement to hatred, the use of banned symbols, acts of violence or other politically motivated offenses. Long-term involvement in a leadership or organizational capacity within a group demonstrably hostile to the constitutional order may also be sufficient.

An unpopular opinion, conservative or right-wing views or a single political statement are not enough under a constitutionally sound interpretation of the law. What is likely to be required is evidence that the individual has actively worked against fundamental constitutional principles.

Under the new law, the OLG could reject the applicant in the case described above.

The classification of an organization by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution may be an important indicator, but it does not by itself replace an assessment of the applicant’s own conduct.

This limitation follows primarily from the Federal Administrative Court’s requirement of active conduct and the seriousness of the interference with freedom of occupation. The vagueness of the wording is widely seen as creating a risk of arbitrary interpretation.