The recent incidents in the airspace over Northern Europe have once again reminded us that every day of the war in Ukraine carries the risk of the conflict spreading westward and NATO states being directly confronted with Russia. This could happen even if no one wants it — through the interplay of unforeseen events and their consequences.
The risk is all the greater when some influential actors actually desire a major war. Among these influential actors are Russia, the United States, Ukraine, and the European NATO states. Their motives differ — from ending the war immediately, to prolonging it, to expanding it. Let us try to reconstruct them rationally.
Russian interests and the divided United States
Russia seeks an extended buffer zone along its western border and a neutral regime in Kyiv. It therefore has no interest in expanding the war — doing so would require additional soldiers and resources from an already strained economy, without yielding any real benefit. It does not aim to conquer western Ukraine, whose administration would only be a burden, and even less the Baltic states or Poland — as Western propaganda claims.
It is prepared to end the war, but demands that the political West recognize not only Crimea but also the four territories it has not yet fully conquered as Russian territory, and renounce its military influence over the remaining parts of Ukraine. As long as this condition is not met, Putin prefers to continue the war.
While Russia has a unified and more or less rational leadership, the United States is divided. The elusive President Trump often calls for peace, but at the same time threatens escalation. Some of his allies and rivals, however, benefit from the war’s continuation and can even imagine its expansion into Central Europe — though without direct U.S. involvement. They like how the war keeps their Russian rival busy and weakened, and they see no reason to end it. Some may still hope that Putin’s regime will eventually collapse under the strain.
Trump’s impossible demands on the Europeans
Trump himself, on the other hand, seems to continue preferring peace. He sees in it an opportunity for economic cooperation with Russia, without the fear of it becoming a global rival comparable to China.
His occasional escalatory statements can be interpreted as an attempt to appease the pro-war faction in Washington and to pressure his European vassals. He repeatedly rejects European pleas for greater American involvement. It must be a thorn in his side, as it complicates any potential agreement with Russia.
When he promises Europeans that he will contain Russia once Europe overcomes its dependence on Russian gas, he is apparently just playing with them. He sets conditions that he knows Europe cannot meet. Their failure, however, allows him to say to Europe: You are funding Putin yourselves with your imports — so leave me out of Ukraine.
Kyiv tries to expand the war into Europe
The preferences of the regime in Kyiv are clear. It seeks to expand the war into Europe, and as long as that fails, it must keep the war going. Peace under the current conditions (and there are unlikely to be better ones) would mean that the Kyiv regime admits the loss of a large part of its territory and acknowledges that the deaths of hundreds of thousands — likely now millions — of Ukrainians were pointless and unnecessary.
By contrast, drawing Europe into the war sustains Kyiv’s illusion that Russia can be pushed back — or even defeated — and that everything could turn out differently than it now inevitably seems. Zelensky, who was elected on a promise to reach an agreement with Russia, maneuvered himself into war. He yielded to Western representatives and their Ukrainian agents — the Soros NGOs and the Bandera militias. When he now demands real sacrifices from the West, he is, from his point of view, acting rationally and morally.
While the negotiations between Russia, the U.S., and Ukraine still display a degree of rationality, the situation in Europe is more complex. Only Hungary and Slovakia today openly advocate a rational position. They want immediate peace, have no interest in prolonging the war, and wish to avoid its expansion at any cost. Peace means cheap Russian gas; expansion means war on their own soil.
What the Baltic states, Britain, and France want
The states along the Baltic, from Poland to Finland, pursue a different strategy. They see the continuation of the war as a means of stopping alleged Russian expansion. It is hard to imagine that they actually desire a wider war, since they would be the first affected. When they stress that they expect and are preparing for it, they are really reminding Trump of the obligations of America’s allies.
In that, they differ from Britain, even though they share almost identical positions on Ukraine. The British, together with the Americans, are among the original instigators of the entire conflict — from the Maidan and Johnson’s mission to Kyiv in April 2022 to covert operations by British intelligence officers and soldiers.
They have long pursued a strategy of weakening Russia — similar to the Baltic states — but unlike them, they can imagine that an expansion of the war might not necessarily harm British interests. Their Russian enemy would become entangled in a costly chaos safely distant from British shores.
Unlike Britain, France did not start the war, but it eventually found purpose in it. The war allows it — as a nuclear power with the EU’s most significant army — to play the role of Europe’s military leader and protector. Let us emphasize: play the role, not be the role — for its resources are insufficient. President Macron also enjoys the added bonus of escaping domestic politics, where he has lost everything.
France will be content for the war to continue, and can even imagine an escalation, as it repeatedly plans to send European “peacekeeping forces” to Ukraine. It can tell itself it is not directly threatened, since Germany lies between France and Eastern Europe.
The London–Paris–Kyiv axis as a threat to Central Europe
Germany has lost its way in Ukraine. Its long-standing economic and foreign policy — based on anti-militarism, diplomacy, cheap Russian resources, and non-European markets — lies in ruins. Germany today does not know where it stands or to whom it belongs.
Corporate lawyer Merz embodies this confusion just as well as his predecessor Scholz. At the end of August, he agreed with the Belgian prime minister that frozen Russian assets in Belgium should not be touched; today, he demands the opposite. For now, he at least seems to resist French military plans — but for how long? Germany is capable of nothing today and could be capable of anything tomorrow.
If we do not want the war to expand into Central Europe, the greatest danger lies along the London–Paris–Kyiv axis. There is, however, hope in a potential agreement between Washington and Moscow. Undoubtedly, such a deal would come at Europe’s expense. Yet the price would still be lower than if Europeans leave it to the British, French, and Ukrainians.
Author: Petr Drulák