On the night of September 9–10, nineteen Russian drones violated the airspace of the Republic of Poland — eighteen from the direction of Belarus and one from Russia’s Kaliningrad region.
Some of them were shot down by Polish and allied aircraft. This marked the first time since the Second World War that the Polish Air Force had used weapons within the country’s own airspace.
“Shortly after the violation of our airspace, the Polish information landscape fell victim to one of the largest disinformation attacks in history,” said Polish government spokesman Adam Szłapka. According to Szłapka, as part of a “targeted Russian operation,” there were attempts to downplay the incident, shift the blame onto the Ukrainian side, and sow conflict among Poland’s state institutions.
Shortly afterward, on September 14, a Russian drone violated Romanian airspace. On September 19, three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets — equipped with supersonic air-to-surface Kinzhal missiles (from the Turkish word for “dagger”) — spent twelve minutes over Estonia, and just hours later, two Russian fighter jets breached the security zone over a Polish drilling platform in the Baltic Sea.
NATO’s response
The Alliance dispatched Italian F-35 fighter jets against the Russian aircraft over Estonia to drive them away. Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal subsequently announced that Tallinn would call for urgent consultations under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty — barely a week after Warsaw had done the same.
It should be recalled that, under Article 4, a NATO member may call urgent consultations if it believes that its territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened.
On September 22, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a speech by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski before the UN Security Council:
“If another aircraft or missile enters our airspace without authorization — whether intentionally or by accident — and is shot down, and its debris falls on NATO territory, then please don’t come here to complain — you were warned. Thank you,” Sikorski said.
Former commander of the Polish special forces unit GROM, Roman Polko, stated that Poland should “simply shoot down” intruding aircraft in such cases. According to a survey, 67 percent of Poles support such action.
U.S. President Donald Trump also commented on the incidents, declaring that NATO member states should shoot down Russian planes if they enter Alliance airspace. “I fully agree with President Trump,” said NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte. In his view, the Alliance “will do whatever it takes to protect its people, cities, and infrastructure when needed.”
Russia responded through Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, who called the statements of NATO leaders “irresponsible and reckless.” Moscow also denied that its fighter jets had violated Estonian airspace.
Diverging expert opinions
Some security analysts urge caution in possible responses. Estonian MP and security expert Eerik-Niiles Kross emphasized that shooting down a Russian aircraft “is the very last option, one requiring political authorization.”
“The Turks shot down [the Russian Su-24 in 2015, editor’s note] with their own planes, but Estonia has no aircraft of its own. In response to three Russian MiG-31s, NATO deployed Finnish and Italian F-35s,” said retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Cedric Leighton. In his view, the Alliance’s rules do not permit destruction of aircraft unless they display hostile intent.
William Spaniel, political science lecturer at the University of Pittsburgh specializing in terrorism and conflict, believes that the Kremlin would use the possible downing of one of its aircraft as propaganda to justify a general mobilization of conscripts.
By contrast, Ivo Daalder, director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center and former U.S. ambassador to NATO, told Politico that shooting down a Russian aircraft would be “a measure that would reduce the likelihood of Russia continuing to violate European territory.”
A military curtain along the border
The Finnish–Russian border has been transforming for several years — most intensively since Finland’s accession to NATO after the Russian invasion of Ukraine — with both Russian and Finnish military installations being built along the fence-marked boundary.
In January 2024, the three Baltic states joined the project, approving the construction of a defensive line along their borders with Russia and Belarus. The focus is on the vulnerable Suwałki Corridor, a topic previously covered by Štandard.
At the end of last year, Poland also joined the Baltic states, though many experts have criticized Warsaw for the way the defense line is being built.
“A barbed wire fence, two tanks, and three forest brothers — that’s about all we’d have to overcome if we decided to storm the Baltics. But at the front no one talks about it — we have our own problems. You have to understand, we’ve been fighting for more than three years now, so one more year — possibly even outside Ukraine — won’t kill us,” a Russian army volunteer from an air-defense (PVO) drone unit told Štandard.
NATO’s reaction weaknesses
Štandard also spoke with personal protection specialist and security analyst Vladimír Šajánek.
“Russia knows NATO’s decision-making processes very well in the event of a member’s airspace violation. That’s why it has decided not only to test their execution in real time and space, but above all, the time required for these decisions within the collective process,” the analyst said.
This was indirectly confirmed by Kross, who stated that “Estonia could theoretically have ordered the Russian aircraft shot down, but coordinating such an order with our allies in time would have been nearly impossible.”
According to Šajánek, the Kremlin has also learned, thanks to these drone and aircraft incidents, how “tough” — or not — NATO is willing to be in responding to such activities on its eastern flank.
“Equally important is the role of such operations within hybrid warfare. The insights gained into how these actions can influence an already polarized society on NATO’s eastern border are invaluable to Moscow,” Šajánek concluded.
Will it happen or not?
Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, wrote for Politico on September 25:
“Europe is at war with Russia, whether it likes it or not. It is high time to accept that fact and act accordingly.”
The Russian view was expressed by Vladimir Putin on October 2, when he stressed that “all NATO states are fighting against Russia in Ukraine.”
Although the United States and Canada are also NATO members, Moscow has not violated their airspace and does not spread narratives questioning their statehood — something that cannot be said for the eastern-flank NATO countries sharing a land border with Russia.
Given the gradual U.S. withdrawal from Europe, it is questionable to what extent — if at all — Washington would be willing to support NATO’s eastern flank in the event of a military conflict, other than through arms supplies.
On the other hand, Polish military analyst Konrad Muzyka believes that as long as the war in Ukraine continues, Russia has no free ground forces capable of threatening the North Atlantic Alliance.
The military conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing since 2014 and has undoubtedly affected the European continent. When — and if — it will have tangible consequences for Europeans within the European Union depends on developments on the Ukrainian battlefield, on the degree of readiness of Central and Eastern European NATO members, and above all, on the Kremlin’s intent to test that readiness.
Author: Daniel Halaj