The world according to Trump: pragmatic imperialism in a narcissistic grove

What is written in the seminal foreign policy document is in line with what Trump has been doing in office so far: pushing hard for American interests regardless of the rules, subjugating Latin America and colliding with China.

On the other hand, he is showing more interest in Europe than the last year would suggest. At the same time, the document formulates an inspiring domestic policy. However, it is marred by an unrealistic assessment of American capabilities and a narcissistic emphasis on Trump's exceptionalism.

The US president's administration defines its pragmatism by a conceptual and translational conundrum. It is difficult to translate the phrase that American foreign policy should be "pragmatic without being 'pragmatist', realistic without being 'realist'".

In both cases, the approved term has the same meaning as the rejected term, i.e., realistic and pragmatic action. The solution is provided by the phrase that says that strategy is not based on any political ideology and is solely guided by "what suits America."

Indeed, political realism and pragmatism can also be understood as doctrines that can prescribe certain actions. Trump, however, does not want to be prescribed anything by anyone. This, by the way, may sweep away the criticism of political realists who reject unquestioning US support for the Jewish state.

In most respects, however, Trump overlaps with realism. He assumes the primacy of nation-states as major players, refuses to burden foreign policy with considerations of democracy and human rights, and focuses on a few key interests that he defines in terms of power, that is, not ideologically or normatively.

Trump's addition to the Monroe Doctrine

The first of these interests is exclusive U.S. control over the Western Hemisphere. Trump subscribes to the Monroe Doctrine, which does not allow a superpower other than the United States to create a sphere of influence in Canada or Latin America. The doctrine is complemented by the 'Trump Amendment': it prohibits America's rivals in the Western Hemisphere not only from 'deploying troops or anything that could threaten the United States, but also from owning or controlling any strategically important asset'.

An important asset might be an investment in the Panama Canal, a railway, a mine or a company supplying the US. Trump's amendment not only limits the US's global rivals, but also the sovereignty of Latin American countries. Even giants like Brazil simply cannot afford to act purely according to their own interests in the gravitational field of the US.

In comparison, let us add that the Russians, for example, do not define their interest in relation to Ukraine and other countries in the near-border region nearly so broadly. In terms of the global distribution of power, however, the American interest in controlling the Western Hemisphere is realistic and may not lead to a great power conflict in the foreseeable future.

US versus China in Asia

It is a different story in the second priority area - Asia. While the United States does not claim the same dominance on this continent as it does in Latin America, it denies primacy to China, which it sees as a threat to its economic interests in the region. Together with South Korea, Japan and Australia, they want to contain Chinese influence and militarily deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. At the same time, they hope to win India over to their side.

They regard the opening up of Asia to the economic needs of the US as a matter of vital national interest.
In other words, what the US claims for itself in the Western Hemisphere, it is not prepared to concede to China in its neighbourhood. Realistically, the Americans are no longer seeking global supremacy because they know they are not up to it, but they are making sure of regional supremacy on the American continent and preventing Chinese supremacy in East Asia.

NATO enlargement is out of the question

Europe, the Middle East and Africa are not that important to Washington. The way Americans talk about Europe is almost touching. On the one hand, they note its decline: economic (Europe's weight in global GDP has fallen from 25 per cent in 1990 to 14 per cent today), political (senseless regulations, suppression of political freedoms) and civilisational (massive non-European migration, loss of self-confidence).

On the other hand, they want Europe to pull itself together economically and civilisationally. Preferably without the institutions of Brussels, as a "group of sovereign allied nations", which should serve the United States as an export market, part of supply chains and as an additional weight in the pressure on China. But to pull itself together economically, Europe needs, among other things, Russian raw materials and the Chinese market - both of which go against American interests.

On the contrary, the document is not wrong when it describes Europe as incapable of acting on its own against Russia. No wonder Washington considers it its task to ensure strategic stability between Europe and Russia. Of course, there is no talk of a Ukrainian victory, a Russian defeat and the expansion of NATO, which is constantly being discussed in Brussels, is explicitly ruled out.

Is he really a peacemaker?

There is a marked shift away from the Middle East. It is based on the fact that the US no longer needs oil from the Gulf; on the contrary, it has itself become a global supplier of oil and gas. They still have an interest in Israel being safe and Iran not threatening energy exports, but they are assuming that, thanks to Trump's diplomacy, allies have the upper hand here to ensure that fundamental American interests are safeguarded. Africa has never been a priority area, and that is not changing.

The assessment of the situation in the Middle East is tainted by Trump's belief in his own exceptionalism, his ground-breaking historical role and his contribution to world peace. These illusions run throughout the documentary.

The US president is said to have ended eight wars in "eight months": between Cambodia and Thailand, Kosovo and Serbia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, Pakistan and India, Egypt and Ethiopia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as two Israeli wars - with Hamas and with Iran.

Trump has not ended any of these conflicts, and two cannot even be called wars (Serbia-Kosovo, Egypt-Ethiopia). There has been no more fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but Trump has helped with post-conflict reconciliation. Elsewhere, his intervention temporarily dampened conflict without resolving it (Cambodia - Thailand, Congo - Rwanda). He played no role in the India-Pakistan conflict, and in Israel, by contrast, he aided aggression.

On the one hand, it is positive that the US President is trying to show himself as a peacemaker. It is certainly better for world stability than if he were to cast himself in the role of world gendarme or exporter of democracy. On the other hand, such an unrealistically exaggerated assessment of one's own capabilities and performance is dangerous because it leads to faulty analysis and, consequently, to faulty policy.

Nice, but unrealistic

Delusions also permeate passages about the internal reconstruction of the United States that otherwise contain much common sense. Prosperity is supposed to be based on the renewal of industry, the privileged position of the US in world energy, securing access to vital raw materials, securing supply chains, maintaining American supremacy in international finance, including the dollar as a reserve currency, as well as securing supremacy in biotechnology, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

Prosperity is to be broad-based. It is not enough for the economy to grow, but it must grow in a way that is felt by broad swaths of workers - American workers, not imported labor. Massive migration must end, and Americans must also be given preference over the "global talent" attracted to the country from elsewhere. In employment, merit, not minority privilege, is to rule, in public life, the defense of political freedoms, not the "defense of democracy" or "deradicalization."

Nice, but unrealistic. In the international arena, the U.S. today no longer possesses either the soft or hard power that would allow it to win or coerce the consent of others to the unilateral protectionist actions necessary to realize these goals. They can impose them, but except for the small and weak, they will come back like a boomerang from partners and rivals in protectionist measures against them. Just as aggressive economic measures will lead to a turning away from the dollar.

Domestically, America's ability to produce and innovate has always been contingent on the influx of migrants. While German or Soviet weapons were developed and produced by German and Soviet scientists and engineers, American ones have always depended on talent from elsewhere - first from Europe, then from Asia.

The U.S. lacks the skilled manpower to rebuild the industry, as well as quantum computers. Elon Musk and others conclude that it is impossible to create such a workforce from those who are available, so they want to import the people they need. And the benefit to the workers? Until the ruling oligarchy is forced by crisis or systemic change to make its astronomical returns more widely available, it will not do so.

Even the greatest charisma or force of personality of the holder of the highest office will make no difference. Like Europe, the US is in a phase of economic and civilisational decline.

The question is not how to reverse it with immense optimism, but how to manage it to the greatest benefit of its own people. Such a degree of realism, however, is unlikely to be borne out by the official document.