Bulgaria in decay, Brussels at ease

The government in Bulgaria has fallen again and the country is apparently facing elections again. Here, too, it is true that dependence on foreign capital, domestic oligarchy and corruption is preventing the country's relatively decent economic performance from translating into prosperity for the broader classes.

In the last four years, Bulgarians have gone to parliamentary elections seven times and have seen six prime ministers. The last government faltered shortly after its appointment during the spring protests against the euro, but was only brought to its feet by the autumn protests against corruption, when pro-Brussels progressives as well as Eurosceptic nationalists took to the streets.

The decline of the Bulgarian state and society, however, does not hinder the European institutions' centralisation plans in any way. In January this year, Bulgaria joined Schengen, and in fourteen days' time, the EU's poorest country will be switching to the common currency.

Since the late noughties, Bulgarian politics has been dominated by the Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party of multiple Prime Minister Boyko Borissov. For most of this period, it has occupied government positions. The GERB government is characterised by two features: outwardly, unquestioning loyalty to the EU and NATO, and at home, rampant corruption and clientelism.

Borisov and his party are fraternising in Brussels with the European People's Party, led by the German Christian Democrats. They swear by Brussels values, migration policy, the Green Deal, the war in Ukraine or the euro, but at home they do whatever they want in return. Even though they are winning elections by a landslide, the country is polarising.

Bulgaria at the bottom

To say that Bulgaria is not doing well is a euphemism. Bulgarians live in poverty, which is masked by relatively high GDP figures. According to Eurostat, Bulgaria's GDP per capita is around two-thirds of the European average, equivalent to half the output of relatively wealthy Denmark, for example. That would not be bad at all.

However, the day-to-day reality is not measured by GDP per capita, but by income. The average net annual income of a Bulgarian compared to a Dane is not twice but four times lower. Moreover, as a result of income inequality, a substantial part of the population is far below this average.

As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria's dependence on foreign capital, domestic oligarchy and corruption prevents the country's relatively decent economic performance from translating into prosperity for the broader classes. Bulgaria, however, is at the bottom rung of the EU, worse off than the others. Prospective people are leaving the country in droves. The population has fallen from eight million in 2000 to six and a half million today.

It is against this backdrop of misery and demographic disaster that Bulgarian politics is playing out.

GERB may not be as popular as it once was, but it won the last elections last October by a wide margin, taking a quarter of the vote. His two main challengers, the PP-DB coalition (Continuing Change - Democratic Bulgaria) and the Revival party, received ten percent fewer votes. PP-DB is a pro-Brussels party of well-heeled urban liberals that defines itself against GERB's corruption.

In the European Parliament it is in a joint faction with Progressive Slovakia or the Czech Pirates. Its long-time head Kiril Petkov boasts a Harvard degree, grew up in Canada and only renounced his Canadian citizenship when he joined the government years ago. For nine whole months after that, he led one of the few governments not to include GERB.

By contrast, the Eurosceptic and national-conservative Revival rejects the pro-Russia and pro-Atlantic course and advocates an alliance with Russia. In the European Parliament it sits with the Slovak Republic or the Czech SPD. The party's chairman, historian Kostadin Kostadinov, would like to restore a great Bulgaria. He dreams of annexing both neighbouring Northern Macedonia and the southern regions of Ukraine.

In the spring, Revival organised protests against the adoption of the euro and unsuccessfully pushed for a referendum to decide on euro membership. Although the government was shaken by the demonstrations of hundreds of thousands, it was able to rely on the support of the pro-Brussels PP-DB, which is otherwise at its throat, on the euro issue.

Joint pressure on the government

By autumn, things were different. After the euro was introduced, the PP-DB launched an anti-corruption attack on the government. The streets of Sofia were initially dominated by young urban liberals who see the corrupt GERB government as an obstacle on the road to Europe. But then the protests were joined by voters of the Revival Party, who were angry both at the corruption and at being dragged deeper into the eurozone and into Western projects than they would have liked by GERB, with the support of the PP-DB. These two sections of society have nothing in common politically, but by protesting together they brought down the government.

Now it is up to President Rumen Radev. The former Communist Party member and army officer, who went through American schools in the 1990s, has in recent years defined himself against corruption and stood up for the defence of Bulgarian sovereignty. He does not take as strong a position as the Revival, but he has defined himself against his own governments for adopting Brussels' policies towards Russia and Ukraine, the overpriced purchase of US fighter jets or the suppression of Covid's "disinformation".

He supported both the spring and autumn protests and tried to push for a referendum on the euro. Now he has to deal with a new government: either put one of the parties in charge or set up a caretaker government that will bridge the few months until the next snap election.

But the political instability does nothing to disturb Brussels' expansionist plans.

The European Commission is not deterred either by a weak economy or by the disintegration of state institutions. Economic logic would dictate, at the very least, to postpone joining the eurozone. Its good functioning will certainly not benefit from the enlargement to include a country that is significantly worse off than Greece. However, Brussels seems to believe that further expansion of the monetary empire is good in itself and that, in conditions of misery and chaos, it can better exert its influence as the only strong player on the scene.

In recent years in Bulgaria, it has been the case that it does not really matter who is currently sitting in government. What matters is Brussels' priorities and the local apparatus loyal to Brussels that implements them.