A potential intervention in Iran with ground troops raises serious questions about feasibility and consequences. Airstrikes alone are unlikely to force a decisive outcome, suggesting a risk of a prolonged conflict. Trump, judging by his contradictory statements, appears to have realised this. The Iranian military also seems aware, based on its official stance.
Piotr Mickiewicz, a professor at the University of Gdansk, says Iran is successfully resisting the American superpower, a fact that ‘no narrative’ from the Trump administration will change. He adds that the administration was not prepared for such resistance, which could prove politically damaging. As civilian casualties rise, more Iranians are beginning to view the attack critically, despite earlier opposition to the regime.
Public support for the war varies. Only about 40 per cent of Americans back the US–Israeli campaign, while support in Israel exceeds 90 per cent. Russia is benefiting from rising oil and fertiliser prices. By contrast, the United States, Europe and parts of Asia face economic strain, with risks of migration and famine if the conflict continues.
Easy to threaten, hard to invade: Iran’s advantage
Although there remains a possibility that US forces, after suffering more than 200 casualties and incurring tens of billions of dollars in costs, could withdraw from the conflict without acknowledging defeat, Washington may instead seek to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz. Backed by political and military hardliners, a decision to launch a ground invasion cannot be ruled out.
In the event of such an invasion, Tehran could open a new front in the Red Sea between Yemen and Djibouti, the semi-official Tasnim agency reported on March 25, citing an unnamed military source.
Geography strongly favours Iran. Much of its coastline along the strait is backed by the Zagros mountains, where invading forces would likely ‘bite off more than they can chew’. US analysts describe an invasion as extremely difficult, though not impossible. Contacts with Kurdish groups in early March suggest Washington is already seeking local allies.
Iran intervention raises risks of fragmentation and resistance
Iran, with a population of 92 million, is ethnically diverse. Persians account for roughly 51 to 65 per cent of the population, while Azerbaijanis make up between 16 and 24 per cent, with more of them living in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself. Kurds represent about seven per cent, alongside several smaller ethnic groups.
In addition, between 2.5 million and 4 million refugees reside in the country, around 99 per cent of them Afghans, with a small number of Iraqis.
Given that several non-Persian minorities live in the west of the country and along the strategic strait, Washington might consider encouraging their separation from the centre and offering limited support rather than attempting full occupation.
Yet local dynamics complicate such a scenario. Arabs near the Strait of Hormuz follow Shia Islam rather than Sunni Islam. Despite any offer of independence, they may feel closer to Tehran than to cooperation with external actors, described by local Islamists as ‘crusaders’ from the US or ‘Zionists’ from Israel.
Logistics and manpower constrain US options in Iran
With one aircraft carrier and 16 surface combatants, the US fleet in the region represents the largest concentration of naval forces since five carrier strike groups were assembled at the start of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Iran claims to possess substantial stockpiles of suicide naval drones. A recent military exercise off the coast of Portugal highlighted how drones are reshaping not only the land battlefield. During the exercise, Ukrainian naval drones exposed the vulnerability of large modern vessels. ‘The era of large military machines is coming to an end; the future belongs to drones in all elements,’ said Lieutenant Colonel Maxym Zhorin of Ukraine’s elite 3rd Army Corps.
The Americans also lack the logistics required for the sustained transport of forces from the sea to the Iranian mainland.
Naval forces in the region are further constrained by a shortage of Marines, although the US is deploying reinforcements. These may suffice if Trump opts for a limited operation focused on securing coastal positions, clearing mines and reopening the Strait of Hormuz without advancing inland.
Past conflicts illustrate the scale such operations require. In the early weeks of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, around 160,000 troops were deployed, rising to nearly 590,000 by May. During Operation Danube in 1968, Soviet-led forces eventually reached around half a million troops in Czechoslovakia.
In 2022, Russia launched its campaign against Ukraine with between 150,000 and 190,000 troops. The US could in theory sustain a large-scale operation, with 1.33 million active personnel and more than 770,000 in reserve forces.
Iran’s military is substantial. It ranks among the world’s leading armed forces, with roughly 610,000 active personnel, 350,000 reservists and around 220,000 paramilitary troops.
The history of war shows that such calculations rarely hold. Military plans often collide with reality within days, and conflicts expected to end quickly can last for years, as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated.
Toppling Iran’s regime could open the door to chaos
A rapid advance inland towards the capital cannot be ruled out. The aim could be to overthrow the regime and allow opposition forces to emerge. Yet the number and competing interests of these groups make swift consensus and the creation of a new system unlikely.
Occupation forces would therefore be required for a period, including beyond the immediate vicinity of Tehran. Given Iran’s population of more than 90 million, this would demand a substantial deployment of troops, which the US is unlikely to sustain.
If no occupation follows a regime collapse, Iran would more likely face civil war than a revival of a stable, non-Islamist state.
