“It’s all about China”

Yet the long-term strategic direction of US policy remains clear. Despite the noise in communication, one constant has endured: China is the United States’ principal global rival.

Although the Asian power is rarely mentioned explicitly in individual conflicts, the effort to weaken China may be a key factor shaping the actions of the current administration.

That view was expressed directly by Zhassulan Ospanov of Teniz Capital Asset Management in an interview with Forbes.

“In our assessment, Washington is far more focused on strategic competition with China than on issues such as human rights in Iran, drug trafficking in the Caribbean, or nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East", he said.

A Cold Energy Front

The argument that Trump’s actions in Iran, the detention of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the push to acquire Greenland are primarily aimed at weakening China is only one of several interpretations. In some cases, it may be the central objective; in others, a secondary effect.

While the debate is unlikely to be resolved, one point stands out: all three moves by the Trump administration this year have worked against China’s interests, particularly in the energy sector. In Greenland’s case, the potential is there.

Despite rapid advances in renewable energy, China continues to require growing volumes of fossil fuels.

Its energy mix remains dominated by coal, which accounts for about 61% and is used mainly for electricity and heat. At the same time, nearly one third of electricity already comes from solar, hydro, wind and nuclear sources. As electricity gains ground in heating, renewables are becoming more important in that sector.

In overall terms, however, they still account for only a relatively small share of total energy consumption. Coal is followed by oil and petroleum products at around 18% and natural gas at about 8%.

While China produces large amounts of coal domestically, it depends heavily on imports for other energy sources. More than 70% of its oil consumption relied on imports last year, while for gas the figure has remained close to 40% for some time.

Sanctioned Oil From Venezuela and Iran

Shortly after the US move against Venezuela, speculation emerged that the country’s vast oil reserves were a key motive.

That argument has clear weaknesses. Extraction infrastructure is in poor condition and would require substantial investment. Much of the oil is also extremely heavy and difficult to process. Although the United States has secured control over significant exportable volumes, long-term benefits would depend on major financial commitments, with uncertain returns.

Viewed through the lens of strategic competition with China, however, Venezuela’s importance increases. Chinese companies have invested in the country for years, and it has served as a supplementary oil supplier to Beijing.

Although the volumes involved were not large in terms of China’s overall demand, officially less than 5% of imports and likely somewhat higher in reality, Venezuela faced difficulties selling its oil because of sanctions. As a result, China was able to purchase crude at discounted prices, much as it has done with supplies from Russia and Iran.

Washington’s intervention in January therefore placed one of China’s lower-cost energy sources under US control.

A similar dynamic applies in Iran.

Tehran was exporting roughly 1.4 million barrels of oil per day to China, accounting for more than 10% of its imports. Additional supplies came from Saudi Arabia at around 14% and Iraq at about 10%, meaning roughly half of China’s imported oil originated in the Gulf region.

The conflict poses a serious risk to China’s energy security. In retaliation, Iran has effectively blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a critical route through which most Gulf oil shipments pass. Alternative pipelines exist but have limited capacity.

Tehran’s objective is to constrain supply and drive up prices, thereby increasing pressure on the US administration through financial markets and domestic politics. At the same time, the move also harms China, its strategic partner.

After weeks of conflict and failed negotiations, Trump escalated further by announcing a US blockade of the strait. Although Iran had restricted access, shipments of Iranian oil to China were still being allowed through. The US move therefore not only targets Iran’s revenues but also disrupts China’s physical access to supply.

Greenland and the Energy of the Future

While Venezuela and Iran are primarily associated with oil and gas, Greenland’s importance lies in critical raw materials essential for advanced technologies.

The island’s resources are extensive. Rare earth elements such as neodymium and praseodymium are used in powerful magnets for wind turbines and electric vehicles. Dysprosium and terbium improve heat resistance in such magnets, while yttrium is used in lasers and superconductors.

US interest in Greenland is therefore understandable, particularly as China currently leads in both extraction and processing of rare earths. Gaining control would also limit the growing presence of Chinese firms. One example is the Kvanefjeld deposit, owned by Australia’s Greenland Minerals but majority-controlled by China’s Shenghe Resources.

The proposed annexation of Greenland did not materialize. That may reflect competing priorities, including developments in Iran, as well as the high costs and long timelines required to fully exploit the island’s resources.

Despite this, the United States remains a dominant energy exporter. At the same time, it is clear that while oil and gas define the present, the future of energy will increasingly depend on rare earths and other strategic materials.

Iran, Venezuela and Greenland may thus appear as unrelated crises driven by different causes and motives. And perhaps they are. But there is also a broader US effort to secure control over the energy of today and tomorrow unfolding behind the scenes.