Since 2011, Syria and its future prospects have been discussed largely in negative terms. Since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime began, the country has been in rapid decline. Even after his fall in December 2024, there was little optimism about Syria’s prospects.
Rebels led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former member of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and later leader of its Syrian offshoot, the al-Nusra Front, took power. The group later allied itself with other rebel factions in Syria and formally broke away from al-Qaeda under the name Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Al-Sharaa remained at its helm until the group was dissolved after the successful overthrow of the regime.
Although the situation in the country has stabilized somewhat since the takeover, skepticism about future developments remains justified. From the moment he took power, Al-Sharaa pledged to protect religious minorities and played into the hands of progressive Western circles by speaking about the promotion of diversity.
The Fragile Reality Behind Syria’s Pitch
Although Syria’s interim president is trying to recast his image and build goodwill abroad, the reality remains more mundane. Minorities generally do not face systematic persecution, but there have been several bloody incidents during his year and a half in power.
One example is the March 2025 massacre of nearly 1,500 Alawites, which a Reuters investigation linked to factions aligned with the new government’s security apparatus. Another is the attack by Islamist extremists on the Greek Orthodox Mar Elias Church in Damascus, in which more than 20 people were killed.
Sarkis Kassarjian, a journalist specializing in Turkey and the Middle East, says the real reasons for skepticism lie inside Syria: the stability of power, domestic security, judicial reform and transparency in governance. He told Euronews that “more than a year and a half after the formation of the government, we have not seen any progress on the issue of reconstruction in Syria”.
External factors, including regular Israeli attacks, also contribute to the country’s instability. Yet despite all this, Syria is suddenly being discussed as a country with unexpected strategic potential. Paradoxically, that shift is also a consequence of war, namely the conflict with Iran.
Syria as an Energy Hub
After Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a key route for oil, gas, fertilizer and other goods from the Gulf to the rest of the world, traders began looking for alternative ways to move supplies from sellers to buyers.
Much of what reached global markets before the US and Israeli attack on Iran is now being held up. Estimates put the affected flows at 13% of the world’s oil supply, roughly 20% of liquefied natural gas and several other commodities.
Syria is one possible route through which some of that supply could reach the market. Domestic political leaders in particular are convinced of this.
The country benefits strategically from its geographical position. It borders Iraq and Jordan to the southeast and Turkey to the north, while also having access to the Mediterranean.
Al-Sharaa is therefore presenting Syria as a corridor for the transit of goods between the Middle East and the West. At an extraordinary European Union summit in Cyprus, he even floated the idea that the country could help address Europe’s energy security.
He spoke of reviving the long-dormant Four Seas project, under which Syria would act as a kind of energy hub, linking the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea through railways, roads and pipelines.
The pillars of the initiative include the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline, which would allow Iraqi oil to be exported via Syria’s Mediterranean coast, and the revival of the idea of a gas pipeline from Qatar through Jordan and Syria to Turkey and on to Europe. An extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to Turkey is also on the table.
A Vision Still in Its Infancy
Although the country has some of the necessary infrastructure and most networks could technically be restored or expanded, skeptics point out that similar plans have existed for more than 20 years and that their implementation is blocked by numerous risks.
The initiative would require huge investment that might never be recouped.
Kassarjian warns that establishing, maintaining, repairing and guarding a new pipeline network in the Middle East would be an extremely difficult and complex task.
Syria’s advantage is that it appears to have Washington’s blessing. Iran’s blockade of Hormuz is a major thorn in the US side, and Washington welcomes anything that weakens Tehran’s leverage. The current US administration’s attitude was reflected, for example, in a leaked document attributed to Tom Barrack. In it, the former US special envoy to Syria, whose formal role expired at the end of May, advocated a “land bridge” between the Gulf and the West.
The Gulf Arab states also have an interest in such a route. They want to get their production to market as quickly as possible and, ideally, prevent a similar situation from arising again.
Syria, however, must also contend with two states that are far less enthusiastic about such initiatives. The first is Iran, for which the opposite logic applies. Although Tehran is currently weakened, it would be a mistake to write it off entirely.
The bigger problem, however, appears to be Israel, which has long worked to weaken Syria. After the fall of the Assad regime, it used the power vacuum to take control of additional parts of the Golan Heights. In recent weeks, it has also significantly stepped up its military operations in Syria.
A Transit State Rather Than a Key Hub
Against this backdrop, the security of any projects in the country is questionable. Other concerns also remain, not only over corruption and law enforcement but also over practical matters such as the availability of skilled labor.
“At the moment, we lack expertise in Syria. Most of the young professionals, I would say 80% of those who used to work with us, are now in Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. They all left because there has been no work in Syria for 10 or 12 years”, Syrian engineer Ghassan al-Rai told Euronews.
Deutsche Welle lists further obstacles, including tensions between Syrian communities, the presence of Islamic extremists and large quantities of unexploded ordnance in the country.
Syria must also reckon with the possibility that other countries through which the infrastructure would run may not cooperate with its plans. The reasons may range from external pressure by major powers to competition and the construction of alternative routes that bypass Syria.
Turkey’s position will be particularly important, since Ankara is a key player in the plans.
Experts at Karam Shaar Advisory wrote on 26 March that in Syria’s case, “a critical distinction must nevertheless be made between a transit hub and a transit state”.
In their view, a true hub shapes routes, pricing and diversification, while a transit state merely hosts infrastructure determined by external actors.
“Official discourse, including the SPC’s 2030 vision, aspires to the former. Yet current realities [...] suggest the latter”, the report concluded.