By contrast, the American side makes multiple new commitments to Iran that were not on the table before the start of the war.
First, it commits the Americans to “ending all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran, including resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and all unilateral US sanctions, both primary and secondary”.
This is a far cry from President Trump’s pre-war position that the Iranian regime must be deposed, and his mid-war position that only unconditional surrender would be accepted. Now, the existing Iranian regime will be unsanctioned, something that the late ayatollah could only have dreamed of.
Second, the agreement envisages a reconstruction and economic-development plan for Iran worth at least $300bn. This objectively sounds much closer to the persistent Iranian demand for war reparations than it does to any position that the United States adopted in negotiations. Reparations, historically, are generally paid by a defeated military aggressor to its victorious foe.
Third, the agreement purports to extend the end of hostilities to Lebanon, despite Israel not being party to the talks – essentially granting the Iranians an American-guaranteed veto over Israel’s right to self-defense in the event of Hezbollah aggression. This, again, would have been unthinkable before the war.
Fourth, the agreement makes a vague commitment to the “withdrawal of all US forces from the surrounding area”. The extent of this commitment is not clear, but it aligns closely with an Iranian demand in the negotiations for a broad American withdrawal – not only from Iran but from the wider Middle East.
A Strategic Advance for the Mullahs
Objectively, there is no other way to read the memorandum of understanding as anything but a broad-based strategic advance for the mullahs. Yet, subjectively, the Trump administration presents it as a victory and conveniently claims that the real proof of the pudding will be in the negotiations. Yet here, too, a clear weakness is identifiable.
As the memorandum of understanding says: “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to negotiate and reach a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent.”
Note the final four words: extendable by mutual consent. In other words, there is no true “timeline” to make a deal at all.
Consider something further: in recent days, some US politicians such as South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham have suggested that the US Senate would have to ratify any final deal with the Iranians. Technically this is correct, as the Senate could indeed force a vote on any deal it was presented with.
However, nothing in the memorandum of understanding commits the US or Iran to agreeing a final deal at all. Theoretically, the “negotiations” between the two countries could be extended indefinitely, while its heavily pro-Iranian terms remain in effect.
It is often said that the “devil is in the details” – but there is no guarantee whatever that any details will ever emerge.
A Permanent Negotiation?
Advocates for the memorandum of understanding explain this away by suggesting that one purpose of the document is to allow Iranian negotiators to “sell” the document to the more hardline elements within the regime. But this, too, favors the Iranians even in the event that it is true: there is nothing in these terms that suggests that President Trump needs concessions to “sell” the document to anybody, meaning that the balance of rhetorical escalation in any negotiation lies, once again, with Iran. This substantially increases the possibility of the “permanent negotiation”.
Consider a situation where the Iranians, after a period of negotiations, simply threaten to re-close the Strait of Hormuz. Is the United States in this situation going to return to war? Or does the memorandum of understanding not provide the obvious blueprint, in which an Iranian escalation is met by the release of some of the committed funds or an easing of sanctions?
The Big Strategic Picture: An American Retreat
Stepping back from the details, the picture painted in the memorandum of understanding is clear. President Trump and the Americans have retreated fully from their pre-war rhetorical positions while the Iranians have not moved even a single inch from their pre-war red lines. Aside from the fact that this – in the narrow sense of assigning a “winner” – proves that victory in the discussions went to Tehran, the greater problem is that the Iran war may be the biggest Western geopolitical setback since the withdrawal from Vietnam.
Iran, supporters of the deal might say, has been militarily weakened by the loss of its navy. Yet the substantial inflow of funds will allow it to rebuild that capability quickly. Besides, the war proved that, spent on a fleet of thousands of drones, Iran might have more useful ways to invest that money in tormenting Western military planners than simply by replacing ships. Supporters of the deal might note that many in the Iranian leadership have been killed. Yet the memorandum of understanding suggests that, if anything, that dead generation of mullahs and their servants has been replaced by younger versions yet more committed to their red lines.
As for the nuclear part of the deal, the Americans have failed even to secure Iran’s nuclear material. The country’s position is exactly the same as it was before a single shot was fired. Whether one believes Iran or not is a subjective exercise – but President Trump’s reversal from being certain that Tehran was lying to certain that it is now being truthful is objectively observable. And rather incredible.
We are a very long way from the regime change that was promised. And those Iranians who took to the streets in protest, and were mown down in their thousands after President Trump promised that “help was on the way”, have been betrayed in the most unforgivable way. The mullahs, after this deal, are stronger than ever.
“So much winning”, they might be saying. Perhaps, in Iran, they are almost tired of all the winning.
