During the earliest phases of the joint US-Israeli campaign against the Iranian regime, which featured a series of assassinations of senior officials in Iran, a joke circulated widely on the internet: soon, the wags claimed, the only people left alive in the Iranian leadership would be Mossad agents.
Now, a remarkable tale from The New York Times alleges, in effect, that this was exactly the plan. The paper reports in startling detail about Mossad’s years-long effort to recruit and groom former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad:
“Mr. Ahmadinejad’s 2024 visit to the university and a second one the following year were part of a yearslong Israeli effort to groom him as an intelligence asset who, when the time came, could be installed as Iran’s new leader, according to both American and Iranian officials familiar with the operation, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe sensitive intelligence.
“Recruiting Mr. Ahmadinejad was of such priority for Israel that the country’s then-spy chief David Barnea even traveled to the Hungarian capital in 2024 to meet with Mr. Ahmadinejad personally, according to former American officials. Soon afterward, they said, Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, notified the CIA that it had been in contact with Mr. Ahmadinejad.”
Justified Skepticism
The world of espionage is so murky that those who express skepticism of this story are not without good reason: there is a world in which it suits Western intelligence agencies perfectly well to destabilize Iran by allowing the public leak of information which implicates a top Iranian as the very worst thing one can be in that country – an agent of the hated Jews.
Regardless of whether the story is true or false, it is perfectly designed to play into the paranoia of the regime in Tehran. However, an important question should be asked: has the Mossad strategy of infiltration and decapitation actually worked?
The answer is probably yes on a tactical level, but no on the strategic level.
Tactical Genius – But Strategic Misstep?
There is no doubt, for example, that the strategy of turning key figures in Iran’s security architecture has permitted the Israelis and their Western allies to pull off a series of spectacular strikes in recent years, ranging from the assassination of senior Hamas terrorists in Tehran to the complete infiltration of Hezbollah in Lebanon and, finally, to the mesmerizing blow that “eliminated” – in Israeli parlance – the supreme leader himself. These operations have both projected an image of Israeli invincibility on the world stage and grievously destabilized Israel’s enemies.
However, on a strategic level, what has changed? There is a strong case to be made that Israel’s strategy of using its intelligence-gathering genius to target senior officials has actually cleared the ground not for moderation, but for extremism. According to most informed observers, for example, the new generation of leaders in Tehran are actually more hardline and opposed to peace than the generation recently vaporized in Western strikes. Hezbollah and Hamas remain stubbornly in existence, the latter clinging like a limpet to power in Gaza, and the former still capable of firing apparently endless barrages at northern Israel. With no clear leader in place anywhere, the question arises: has the genius of Mossad served only to provide Israel with enemies with whom it cannot hope to negotiate peace?
There is, in other words, a danger that Israel has become exceptionally proficient at removing the men presently trying to destroy it, without becoming any more proficient at creating a situation in which fewer men wish to destroy it.
It is true, of course, that if a man is planning an attack on Israeli civilians, then the Israeli government has every right to prevent him from doing so, whether by arresting him, bombing him or arranging for his pager to explode in his trousers. Nor should the achievements of Israeli intelligence be understated. The penetration of supposedly secure organizations such as Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has been one of the most remarkable military and intelligence accomplishments of the modern era.
But tactical brilliance is not itself a strategy.
The problem with the policy of perpetual decapitation is that organizations which expect their leaders to be assassinated adapt themselves accordingly. Those who rise are not necessarily the wisest or most capable, but those who are best at remaining invisible, demonstrating ideological purity and refusing contact with the outside world.
Instilling a Suspicion of Moderation?
What is worse is that moderation, in such a system, becomes inherently suspicious and therefore personally dangerous. The New York Times, in reporting Ahmadinejad’s alleged turning, cites his increasingly moderate stance toward Israel and the West as evidence. Such a shift becomes dangerous inside a regime constantly hunting for Israeli spies.
Any Iranian official who suggests accommodation with the West risks being accused by his colleagues of being the next Ahmadinejad – a potential Mossad asset being groomed for power. Every Israeli intelligence success therefore carries with it a secondary consequence: it strengthens the position of those who argue that negotiation is merely another form of Western infiltration.
The central question is therefore not whether Israel is entitled to kill its enemies, or even whether doing so makes Israel safer tomorrow morning. It evidently does, in many cases. The question is what political objective these killings are intended to secure.
If the answer is the complete destruction of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Iranian regime, then that should be stated honestly – along with some explanation of who is expected to replace them. If the objective is eventually to negotiate a durable peace, then Israel must consider whether systematically eliminating every authoritative figure on the opposing side leaves anybody capable of delivering one.
The alleged Ahmadinejad operation is fascinating because it suggests that Mossad itself understood this problem. Israel was not merely trying to remove the Iranian leadership: it was attempting to cultivate an alternative. But the apparent failure of that project also demonstrates the immense difficulty involved.
Perhaps the ultimate weakness of the Israeli approach is that its successes have become addictive. Each assassination provides dramatic footage, public satisfaction and indisputable evidence of Israeli superiority. Yet the map remains largely unchanged. The organizations survive. The missiles continue to fly. Another generation of enemies takes the place of the last.
Mossad can apparently reach almost anybody. The question Israel has yet to answer is where, having reached them, it ultimately intends to go.