The threats were aimed at an ally that had never fundamentally disputed Washington’s security concerns. Copenhagen was willing to host more American troops, approve additional facilities and spend considerably more on Arctic defense. Only sovereignty was non-negotiable.
Greenland’s government likewise did not oppose a stronger Western military presence, but it insisted on deciding its own future. Among the population, Trump’s takeover plans were widely rejected.
With his maximalist demands, Trump shifted the benchmark for any eventual outcome. After months of talk of a forcible takeover, an ordinary security agreement suddenly looked like a happy ending to a dangerous crisis.
This crisis did not arise because Denmark wanted to close American bases or invite Chinese troops into Greenland. Trump created it with his own demands. Now he can present the return to cooperation as proof that his threats worked.
Still, the Deal Has Its Merits
America did not have to start from scratch to secure military access to Greenland. For decades, the 1951 agreement has allowed the United States, together with Denmark, to establish defense areas, station troops, build facilities and use ports and airfields.
Additional troops, radar installations or parts of Trump’s planned Golden Dome missile defense system therefore did not require American ownership of the island. Washington needed the consent of its Danish and Greenlandic partners. That consent now appears to have been given.
Trump may have won a real strategic gain should Greenland one day become independent. Its roughly 56,000 residents have the right to break away from Denmark after a referendum and subsequent negotiations. The resulting agreement would, however, need endorsement in a second referendum and the consent of the Danish Parliament. A treaty among all three governments could ensure that the American bases remain in place afterward.
Trump’s claimed veto over security-sensitive investments would go even further. The existing agreements give Washington no general say over who invests in Greenlandic mines, ports, airports or communications networks.
If Chinese or Russian companies needed written US approval in future before investing in such projects, that would be a significant new power. America could then not only protect its military installations but also influence part of Greenland’s economic development.
Whether the treaty contains these rights is still unknown. Denmark and Greenland confirm neither an American investment veto nor Trump’s claim that Washington will be able to do what is necessary to secure and defend the island.
Trump spent months bombarding his allies with purchase offers and takeover threats, only to conclude a treaty covering the very military cooperation Denmark had long been willing to provide. Protection for the American bases after Greenlandic independence and a veto over Chinese investment would be real successes. Whether the treaty provides for both remains to be seen.
The only certainty is that Trump did not get what he originally demanded. His true masterpiece is the stagecraft: first he turned an accommodating ally into an adversary, and now he sells that ally’s concessions as a capitulation.
