Those in Western Europe who remember the 1973 oil crisis will recall that the French government responded with a campaign slogan: "La France n'a pas de pétrole, mais elle a des idées" ("France has no oil, but it has ideas").
And indeed, Paris had an excellent idea at the time: to build a network of nuclear power plants to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. It did not stop at words. Between 1977 and 1990, France built 54 reactors and, in the space of a generation, transformed its energy balance and its position in Europe.
Today, the continent faces a different challenge. It is no longer a shortage of oil, but a shortage of rare metals. Europe does not have all the metals it needs, but it does have decent reserves of lithium, nickel, and rare earths. The question, however, is whether it still has the same self-confidence, technical capabilities, and courage to turn ideas into actions that would enable it to rid itself of its dependence on the superpowers—which have made the struggle for raw materials a pillar of their economic and foreign policy.
The European bureaucratic solution
The battle for rare metals did not begin with Donald Trump's arrival in the White House at the beginning of this year. With his demand to take over Greenland, Trump sent a clear signal that rare metals are a strategic resource that will be fought over geopolitically.
In fact, this issue was already known in professional circles, not only in the US but also in Europe. For example, French author Guillaume Pitron wrote a book in 2018 entitled La guerre des métaux rares (The War for Rare Metals: The Hidden Face of the Energy and Digital Transformation).
In the book, which has been translated into more than ten languages, the author describes China's strategic interests in building a mining and processing industry. The conclusion was very harsh for Europe, as Pitron highlighted the lack of interest in this issue among European politicians at the time.
We had to wait more than six years for Europe to take action. Brussels is doing what it does best. It sees bureaucracy as the way to solve the whole problem. On May 23, 2024, a law called the Critical Raw Materials Act came into force in the European Union. Its aim is to ensure that the EU has access to sufficient quantities of raw materials that are crucial for its economy, energy, and defense.
According to data from 2022, the EU's dependence in this area is relatively high. China accounts for 86 percent of global production of rare metals, with Europe importing 98 percent of its rare earths from there. Turkey accounts for 93 percent of borates, Brazil for 85 percent of niobium, and Russia holds 40 percent of global palladium production. It is therefore good that the EU is asking itself the question of independence – albeit late, but still.
Brussels distinguishes between "critical" and "strategic" raw materials. The former comprise a long list of all the metals that Europe needs and finds difficult to obtain. The latter are a subset of critical raw materials.
Strategic raw materials are those that are essential for the production of batteries, turbines, and satellites. They include elements such as lithium, cobalt, copper, titanium, and rare earths. There are exactly 17 elements on the list. However, this list is not final and can be expanded as needed. It will be a challenge, especially for Brussels officials, to keep this list constantly updated.
According to the European framework, projects focused on the extraction and processing of strategic raw materials are to be given priority in the approval process, easier access to financing, and the status of a project in the public interest.
These changes are a step in the right direction, but the question remains whether they will be enough. Shortening the approval period may speed up the start of projects, but in the context of the entire mine preparation process, it is only a small part of the journey. It usually takes ten to fifteen years, sometimes even longer, from the discovery of a deposit to the start of commercial mining.
Unrealistic plans modeled on communist five-year plans
This brings us to the unrealistic part of the Critical Raw Materials Act. Following the model of communist five-year plans, it also sets specific targets. The plan is as follows: ten percent of strategic raw material consumption should be mined directly in Europe, forty percent should be processed or refined in European plants, and a quarter should come from recycling. At the same time, no single third country may cover more than 65 percent of imports of any strategic raw material.
The goal of limiting dependence on a single country to less than 65 percent sounds good in a political document, but the world of rare metals is much more concentrated than Brussels admits. For most raw materials, there are two to three major players, with China dominating not only mining but also processing.
Graphite is a good example. Almost 100 percent of the refined graphite used in batteries comes from China. Getting this figure below 65 percent by 2030 is more than utopian. Diversification is therefore strategically necessary, but physically and economically hardly feasible within the time frame set by the EU.
Tin dominates lithium reserves
It is rather naive to expect Brussels officials to resolve the practical and technical difficulties of this issue. Although Europe does not have all the strategic raw materials on its territory, it is not a blank map from a geological point of view.
The Old Continent has confirmed reserves of lithium, rare earths, tungsten, and tin, all of which are key metals for the green transition.
The largest European lithium deposit is Cínovec in the Czech Republic. It is estimated to contain more than seven million tons of lithium carbonate equivalent. The deposit has the potential to cover a significant part of European demand for batteries. Significant reserves are also found in Mina do Barroso in Portugal. The third key project is Keliber in Finland, where construction of a mine and processing plant is already underway.
A typical example of how long the road from exploration to implementation can be is Cínovec in the Czech Republic. The first geological surveys were conducted there as early as 2008. In 2014, the Australian company European Metals Holdings obtained a permit for further in-depth exploration.
Then, in 2017, the lithium scandal broke out. The then opposition party ANO criticized the Czech government for selling off national wealth to foreign interests. The government subsequently involved the semi-state-owned energy giant ČEZ in the project. This year, the project was designated strategic thanks to the Critical Raw Materials Act. Despite this assistance, however, the Czech Republic will not see its first lithium extraction between 2028 and 2030.
France's decision to build nuclear power plants was an act of courage, not administration. Europe needs the same thing today: more courage than directives. Otherwise, its future will once again be exploited by someone else.