The prime ministers of Slovakia and Hungary have long been among the figures arguing for the continued presence of Russian commodities within the European Union.

For the moment, the question of whether they are acting out of political calculation or genuine concern for state interests can be set aside. Whatever the motives of Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico may be, their approach in the energy sector has in some respects proved more far-sighted than that of many European elites.

Russia has lost buyers – but can redirect exports

After more than four years of war, around twenty rounds of sanctions and numerous embargoes, Russia has not lost its ability to sustain the conflict.

Sanctions have had some impact, and the long-term outlook for the Russian economy remains uncertain. Yet they have not achieved their fundamental objective. The war continues, and Moscow has succeeded in redirecting the overwhelming majority of its exports to other markets.

Russian commodities are sold at a discount to global market prices. The scale of that discount remains uncertain. Some estimates suggest as much as $30 per barrel in the case of oil, although the effective reduction may be smaller because additional fees are often charged through various channels rather than reflected directly in the price of the commodity.

Dependent on a single pipeline

Europe, meanwhile, experienced a severe energy crisis. At the outset, it was driven largely by uncertainty over energy security while the continent remained heavily dependent on Russian supplies. A strategic shift was therefore understandable. What is taking place now, however, bears little resemblance to genuine diversification.

Countries in the eastern part of the European Union once stood at the beginning of major oil and gas pipeline routes. Once the last remaining connections from Russia are shut down, they will find themselves at the end of the system. The concerns expressed by Hungary and Slovakia must be understood in that context.

The issue is not only the price of Russian commodities, which have historically been slightly cheaper, or the loss of transit fees previously collected by those countries. There is also the question of limited transport routes. In a crisis, Hungary and Slovakia could become dependent on the solidarity of other states and on the price they might demand for emergency supplies.

Few governments would willingly accept such a position.

In the case of oil, the Druzhba pipeline can effectively be replaced by only one alternative: the Adria pipeline, which runs from the Croatian port of Omišalj to Hungary and Slovakia.

According to Croatia, the pipeline’s capacity should be sufficient. It is said to be capable of transporting up to 14 million tonnes of oil annually, roughly matching the combined demand of both countries. The problem is that it has never operated at full capacity. At its peak, Adria has transported only about two million tonnes per year. Tests under higher loads have produced mixed results.

For that reason, the Hungarian energy company MOL and its Slovak subsidiary Slovnaft have long argued that the pipeline cannot yet be regarded as a reliable or fully fledged alternative to Druzhba.

The disagreement over the pipeline’s technical capacity is expected to be addressed through new testing involving independent observers, including representatives of the European Commission.

Bratislava could theoretically also use a reverse flow through the Druzhba pipeline from the Czech Republic. However, that route connects to pipelines from Germany whose capacity is sufficient only for Czech consumption. Implementing reverse flow would also require significant investment and several months of technical modifications, which makes it a rather limited additional option.

In that broader context, it becomes easier to understand why Orbán and Fico have reacted strongly to plans for a complete halt to Russian oil imports, as well as to the recent suspension of supplies via Druzhba. Their concerns are heightened by suspicions that Kyiv may be deliberately delaying the restoration of flows.

Ukrainian officials say the disruption stems from an attack on January 27. Yet when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa visited Kyiv and asked to inspect the Druzhba pipeline in order to assess its condition independently, access was reportedly denied.

Gas presents a challenge for Europe as well

A similar distinction between supply and transport routes applies to natural gas.

From a purely infrastructural perspective, the situation of Slovakia and Hungary is somewhat more favourable than in the case of oil. Several possible routes exist and new capacity is under development.

For Slovakia, energy companies say the most suitable option is a western route from Germany through the Czech Republic. Another possibility runs from Poland. Non-Russian gas can also reach the region from the south through the TurkStream pipeline or via LNG terminals in Croatia. There are also expectations linked to Romania’s Neptun Deep gas field in the Black Sea, which will be connected to Hungary through new pipelines.

Nevertheless, the eastern route through Ukraine had previously been the most advantageous for both countries. Its capacity is enormous and Russia has traditionally been able to supply gas flexibly, adjusting deliveries to demand.

Gas has not flowed through Ukraine since January 2026 because Kyiv declined to extend or conclude a new transit agreement. As a result, Russian gas now reaches the region almost exclusively via TurkStream. As in the case of oil, countries in the region also benefited from transit fees in the past, which they must now pay to states further west.

Russian gas itself is not dramatically cheaper than many alternatives. In practice, however, Europe is replacing it largely with liquefied natural gas, most of it originating in the United States. The same will increasingly apply to Hungary and Slovakia. Gas arriving through routes other than TurkStream will in most cases have been liquefied before transport.

That introduces two complications.

First, LNG requires costly processing. Gas must be liquefied, transported by ship, regasified and then transported onward through pipelines to inland markets.

Second, there is a geopolitical dimension. Europe has shifted from heavy dependence on Russian gas towards reliance on the United States, which already supplies roughly 60 per cent of the continent’s liquefied gas – more than a quarter of its total gas consumption. Russian gas today accounts for roughly 13 per cent of Europe’s supply.

The administration of President Donald Trump has shown little hesitation in using economic leverage to pursue political goals. Spain experienced that pressure after refusing to allow the use of joint US bases for strikes on Iran. Shortly afterwards, Washington halted joint trade arrangements with Madrid.

If Europe ultimately attempts to eliminate all remaining Russian gas supplies, that dependence on the United States is likely to deepen rather than diminish. Alternative suppliers such as Qatar, Nigeria, Azerbaijan and Algeria can increase deliveries only to a limited extent. Canadian gas would in practice still depend on North American export infrastructure, as Canada’s eastern coast lacks the necessary terminals.

Like a roller coaster

Liquefied natural gas brings another disadvantage for Europe: price volatility.

Pipeline gas from Russia historically insulated European markets to some extent from global fluctuations. LNG, by contrast, is traded on the world market. Any disruption in supply quickly affects prices, even when the disturbance occurs far from Europe.

The current conflict in the Middle East provides a clear example.

Following the recent attack by the United States and Israel, Tehran warned that the sea route through the Strait of Hormuz had become dangerous. Around 20 per cent of the world’s LNG and a similar share of oil exports pass through that corridor from the Persian Gulf.

A drone strike reportedly also hit a QatarEnergy facility, prompting Qatar temporarily to halt liquefied natural gas production.

Within four days, the benchmark gas price on the Dutch exchange doubled. Prices later eased somewhat as the conflict did not escalate towards critical energy infrastructure. Even so, a megawatt-hour of gas continues to trade at around €50 – roughly 80 per cent higher than before the weekend offensive against Iran.

For Europe, the prospect of a prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz represents a major concern – not only because of price effects. Direct imports from the region account for less than a tenth of European gas consumption. Yet at a time when the continent is seeking to reduce dependence on Russian commodities and strengthen its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, the loss of additional supply sources would further narrow its options.

Against that background, the idea of eventually restoring some level of Russian gas flows into Europe is beginning to be discussed again. The debate is no longer confined to Orbán and Fico. Norway’s energy minister, Terje Aasland, recently suggested that ‘given the current geopolitical situation’, discussion about a ban on Russian gas should be ‘revived’.