The European Union is approaching a demographic tipping point, as data from national statistical offices show a sustained decline. After decades of growth, the bloc’s population is expected to peak at 453 million around 2026 before entering a gradual decline, with the EU projected to shrink by 5% by mid-century.
The issue of demographic decline raises a wide range of related questions. These include potential causes such as the shrinking number of women of childbearing age and declining sperm counts, as well as broader social factors including the weakening of social bonds through social media or the widespread availability of pornography. The consequences are equally far-reaching, from pressure on pension systems to long-term economic risks.
Across these diverse factors, one theme stands out: the erosion of social cohesion.
The Disintegration of the “Village”
A well-known saying holds that “it takes a village to raise a child”. The phrase reflects the importance of social networks beyond the immediate family.
In recent years, however, that “village” has weakened. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, which confined large parts of the population to their homes, social cohesion has come under increasing strain. The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre has described a “loneliness epidemic”, with one in four EU citizens reporting feelings of isolation in a 2023 survey.
This erosion of cohesion is closely linked to rising social polarization. Individuals increasingly operate within echo chambers, encountering fewer opposing views. Social media algorithms reinforce this dynamic by curating content that sustains user engagement, often at the expense of exposure to differing perspectives.
While these trends predate 2020, the pandemic and subsequent lockdowns accelerated them significantly. At the same time, trust in institutions – including governments, academia and the media – has declined, a shift also noted by the United Nations.
Immigration has added another layer to this development. Social cohesion is influenced in part by shared norms and cultural proximity within communities. Large-scale immigration, particularly in Europe, has therefore become part of the broader discussion.
Demographic trends suggest that these pressures will persist. According to UN projections, eight countries – the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Egypt, the Philippines and India – will account for half of global population growth. Nigeria alone is expected to approach China’s population size by the end of the century.
Exchanging Children for GDP
In developed Western countries, declining fertility is driven by a combination of structural factors. Greater participation of highly educated women in the labor market has led to them delaying starting a family. Combined with widespread access to contraception, this has pushed up the average age at first birth.
A 2024 study notes that, in modern societies, the need for large families to offset high infant mortality has disappeared. As a result, couples increasingly opt for fewer children while investing more resources in each child.
The study also points to the rise of “voluntary childlessness”. In the past decade, the concept of a “childfree” lifestyle has gained prominence. Unlike the term “childless”, which implies absence, “childfree” is framed as a positive choice. Proponents often emphasize financial independence and personal freedom, but this perspective reflects a shift towards prioritizing short-term convenience over family formation.
Younger generations, particularly millennials and Generation Z, increasingly view this lifestyle as a legitimate option. This shift has coincided with rising GDP in many countries, a correlation noted by statistician Hans Rosling.
Rosling argues that humanity may have reached “peak child”, suggesting that global population growth will stabilize as fertility rates decline. He attributed this trend to structural changes, including economic development and women’s integration into the labor market.
According to UN projections, the global population could reach around 10 billion by 2100. However, declining fertility rates mean that long-term growth may level off.
Social Media and Human Behavior
Other perspectives focus less on economic factors and more on social behavior. In a discussion at the Dutch Nexus Institute, entrepreneur Connor Leahy argued that rising living standards alone do not explain declining birth rates. “GDP is growing. People have enough food. Nobody has children”, he said, suggesting that deeper social dynamics are at play.
Leahy pointed to changes in social interaction, particularly among younger generations. He argued that constant exposure to online observation discourages spontaneous behavior, describing a form of digital “panopticon” in which individuals feel permanently watched.
He also criticized dating platforms, arguing that their algorithms are designed to maximize user engagement rather than facilitate long-term relationships. Other participants highlighted additional factors, including education levels and environmental influences, but Leahy’s emphasis on social isolation drew particular attention.
A Return to Tradition?
In earlier debates, immigration was often presented as a solution to demographic decline. That argument has lost some traction, particularly among younger generations, who increasingly question the idea that populations can be treated as interchangeable.
At the same time, there are signs of renewed interest in religion in parts of the West. While the scale of this trend remains debated, some younger individuals are seeking greater certainty and structure, including within traditional forms of religious practice.
The decline in face-to-face interaction has also affected family formation. Fewer in-person encounters lead to fewer relationships, marriages and long-term partnerships. Marriage remains the primary context for raising children. Research suggests that stability within relationships varies significantly depending on social and cultural factors.
While earlier studies found limited differences in divorce rates between religious and non-religious groups, more recent research indicates that regular participation in religious life is associated with lower rates of separation. This raises the question of whether similar patterns apply to fertility.
In the United States, religious groups have historically recorded higher fertility rates than non-religious populations. A 2025 Pew Research survey estimated a total fertility rate of 2.2 among Christians, compared with 1.8 among other groups.
One explanation lies in community structures. Religious groups often provide support networks that facilitate family life, sometimes described as “alloparenting”, or shared childcare.
At the same time, the relationship between faith and family formation is not necessarily one-directional. Some research suggests that individuals become more religious later in life, often in connection with family responsibilities.
Surveys across Europe have produced similar findings. The distinction between nominal and practising believers appears significant, with more active participation in religious life linked to a higher fertility rate.
Sociologist Peter Berger argues that religion provides individuals with a sense of order and meaning. It offers a framework that reduces uncertainty and reinforces confidence in the future. To illustrate this, he presents a simple example: the mother comforting her child at night. From a secular perspective, such reassurance may be temporary. Within a religious framework, however, it is grounded in a broader sense of purpose and continuity.