The debate will be familiar to those who have witnessed similar conversations in Ireland and Spain, in particular: on one side, a committed pro-Palestinian left for whom no sanction of Israel is ever strong enough and no price is too high to pay to express one’s disgust at the supposed “genocide” in Gaza. On the other, a faction bringing together those who support Israel for ideological reasons, and a probably larger faction of centrists and national-self-interest prioritizers who worry that hostility to Israel is bad for business internationally, aligning the country not just against the Jewish state but also against the United States and other Israeli allies.
In Spain, for example, that debate has become particularly divisive: the hard-left Sánchez government’s decision to deny the US use of its own airbases on Spanish soil during the Iran war was perhaps the clearest case where centrists could point to the anti-Israeli policy as undermining Spanish international relations.
In Ireland, the government is dragging its feet on a mostly symbolic boycott, divestment and sanctions bill called the Occupied Territories Bill that would prohibit the tiny amount of trade in goods between Ireland and Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria. There, as in Spain, opposition to the law is not based on love for the Jewish state, but fear of US laws that target those who employ BDS tactics against Israel.
Putting Campaign Promises into Practice
Last week, the new Jansa government in Slovenia announced plans to follow through on its election promises: Palestine, the government has signaled, may be derecognized as a state. The Slovenian embassy may also move to Jerusalem.
Some promises have already been delivered: the government has abandoned Irish-style sanctions on imports from Judea and Samaria and lifted entry bans on various Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Palestinian flag, which until March had flown over the main government building, has been taken down. The arms embargo on Israel – which had symbolic but very little actual effect – has been lifted.
For its part, Jerusalem has responded: Israel will now open, for the first time, an embassy in Ljubljana.
A Rare Diplomatic Boon for Jerusalem
These moves do not only have national implications: for the EU, where a debate about employing some form of trade sanction against Israel has trundled on for over a year, Slovenia’s sudden switch of sides alters the balance of power firmly in the direction of those, like Ursula von der Leyen, who prefer close relations with Jerusalem over hostility. Meanwhile, the camp led by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, which leans more toward some form of sanction, has been weakened.
For the Spanish and Irish, already isolated in Europe, that isolation has grown. With Pedro Sánchez facing an election next year amid a backdrop of unpopularity for his ruling coalition, his Israel stance is yet another pressure point for the opposition parties to target. Surprisingly, and against the run of play, the Israeli position in Europe may be strengthening and becoming less reliant on the support of its traditionally strongest allies in Berlin, Budapest and Vienna.
Meanwhile, the new government in Ljubljana is moving to align itself on foreign policy much more with other Central and South European countries. Having been an outlier because of the heavily pro-Palestinian slant of its politics, Slovenia is now much more in alignment with Croatia, Bosnia, Hungary and Austria.
Perhaps most significantly, at a time when it is isolated internationally and under relentless criticism, the sudden reversal of Slovenian policy has won Jerusalem a new ally, giving hope for its friends internationally that the country’s current diplomatic travails might be reversible in the years to come.
