The Russia-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum has been held since 2003, bringing together the presidents of both countries. At its 22nd gathering, held on 24–25 July in Omsk near the Kazakh border, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made a striking public appeal.
The Kazakh president, who succeeded Nursultan Nazarbayev, said the war in Ukraine should be “frozen”. Vladimir Putin promised to “keep Tokayev informed about developments on the Ukrainian front” and brought the public exchange to a close.
Terms Kyiv Cannot Accept
“The nature of this conflict is not entirely clear to many, including us. … In my humble opinion, it might be worth freezing this conflict and returning to the Istanbul Formula 2.0. Significant progress was achieved there”, Tokayev suggested.
The Ukrainian roadmap presented for the second round of talks in Istanbul in June 2025 proposed an initial ceasefire of at least 30 days and made the current front line the starting point for negotiations over territory.
Moscow’s terms were different. In April 2025, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said peace would require Ukrainian forces to withdraw from all remaining Ukrainian-held territory in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, which Moscow claims in their entirety.
Kyiv has accused Moscow of combining coercive legal measures with systematic Russification in the occupied territories. A decree signed in March 2025 required Ukrainians without a legal status recognized by Moscow to regularize their status or leave by 10 September. A separate decree signed by Putin in November called for a stronger Russian civic identity and wider use of the Russian language in the four regions claimed by Moscow.
Kyiv categorically rejects demands that it surrender territory still under Ukrainian control.
Russia’s position remained unchanged in 2026. In May, Peskov said Ukrainian forces would have to withdraw from the Donbas and other territories claimed by Moscow. Following Tokayev’s remarks on 25 July, Peskov reiterated that the conflict could not be frozen unless Kyiv accepted the conditions set out by the Russian Foreign Ministry two years earlier.
A Familiar Balancing Act
“Of course, I am sorry that young people are dying. They are the genetic heritage of the brotherly nations of Russia and Ukraine. All of this must be stopped, because I am firmly convinced that what is happening benefits and delights the enemies of both Russia and Ukraine”, the Kazakh president explained in Omsk.
According to Tokayev, any ceasefire should be accompanied by security guarantees from the major powers, including Russia. “And then we must move toward the long-awaited peace”, he added. Putin made no effort to conceal his displeasure.
Tokayev had caused a similar stir during Putin’s state visit to Astana in the fall of 2023, when the two presidents also joined the 19th Russia-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum in Kostanay by video link.
Seconds after Putin twice mispronounced Tokayev’s name, the Kazakh president unexpectedly addressed the Russian delegation in Kazakh. A video showing startled Russian officials, including Putin, hastily reaching for their earpieces went viral.
Although the forum is dedicated to bilateral cooperation aimed at raising living standards in both countries through “the development of trade, economic, humanitarian, cultural and scientific relations”, Tokayev used his meeting with Putin to set out Kazakhstan’s public position on the war.
He appeared to be testing how far he could go without directly criticizing the Kremlin or condemning its efforts to occupy Ukrainian territory. His appeal was also rooted in pragmatism: beyond the human cost he cited, Tokayev is likely concerned about Central Asia’s energy security and Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian infrastructure.
Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries have disrupted fuel supplies to parts of Central Asia. In June, Russian gasoline shipments to Central Asia and Afghanistan fell by 34% from May, while jet fuel deliveries dropped by more than 92%, prompting Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to seek alternative suppliers. Diesel shipments rose, however.
Kazakhstan is among the world’s 10 largest oil producers, but access to foreign markets depends heavily on Russian infrastructure. More than 80% of its oil exports pass through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline to a Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk.
On 26 July, Kazakhstan’s daily oil and gas condensate production fell by more than half from its June average after loadings at the terminal were suspended following drone attacks. Operations resumed the following day.
A separate Ukrainian drone strike on the Orenburg gas processing plant in June had already forced the Karachaganak field to cut its oil and condensate output by about a quarter. Such disruptions are likely to strengthen Tokayev’s interest in bringing the war to an end.
An Ally on His Own Terms
At the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in Moscow in October 2024, Tokayev proposed CIS Plus, a format intended to expand and strengthen regional relations among the bloc’s members.
“Belarus welcomes the initiative of our Kazakh colleagues to create the ‘CIS Plus’ format as a new platform for multilateral cooperation between the member states of the Commonwealth and their international partners”, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said.
The format was formally established at a meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State in Dushanbe in October 2025.
Tokayev also attended the Victory Day parade in Moscow on 9 May 2026, marking the 81st anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat. He and his Uzbek counterpart, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, had initially declined their invitations and were absent from the Kremlin’s official guest list two days before the event. Their appearance on Red Square therefore came as a surprise. At a bilateral meeting on the eve of the parade, Putin thanked Tokayev for coming to Moscow.
Tokayev’s relationship with the Kremlin thus resembles the balancing act pursued by Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov. Although Karimov entered into an alliance with Russia in 2005, he deeply distrusted Moscow and consistently placed Uzbekistan’s national interests first.
At home, Tokayev emerged from his predecessor’s shadow during the unrest and alleged coup attempt of 2022, removing several Nazarbayev loyalists from senior positions and overseeing the arrest of members of the former president’s extended family.
The origins of the crisis remain disputed. Competing theories attribute it to Nazarbayev loyalists, a power grab by Tokayev or Russian involvement. None has been conclusively established, and there is still no consensus in Kazakhstan about what happened.
Earlier this year, Tokayev further strengthened his position when voters approved a new constitution that overhauled 80% of the previous text. Chatham House analyst Kate Mallinson described the changes as a move toward a more institutional, less personalist form of authoritarianism resembling China’s political economy, coupled with a retreat from Western-led liberal economic models.
In July, the Constitutional Court ruled that presidential terms served under the previous constitution would not count toward the new single-term limit, making Tokayev eligible to seek another seven-year term. It remained unclear whether that would require an early election or whether he would serve out his current mandate until 2029. If he runs again, he could remain in office until 2036.