Cologne's Response Came from the Wrong Department
The list reached several departments within Cologne's immigration authority. According to a WDR reconstruction, the only reply came from the department handling the city's right-to-remain program. It had no role in deportations and said none of its cases faced imminent removal. The unit actually responsible for returns remained silent.
The city says the confusion stemmed from an unusual chain of communication. The list had been sent directly from Coesfeld, bypassing both the ministry and the district government. Cologne's immigration authority therefore contacted the district government, which intended to refer the matter to the ministry.
Nearly two years later, it was no longer possible to reconstruct what happened next. Cologne City Director Dörte Diemert described the communication as "ambiguous and unfortunate" but denied that the city had refused to act.
The case became particularly sensitive once attention turned to the migrants behind the file numbers. Of the 471 Cologne residents required to leave Germany, 218 were enrolled in the city's right-to-remain program in 2024. According to the city, 119 had already come to police attention, more than half the group. By 2026, this was still true of 76 of the 153 participants from the Coesfeld List.
They included Huso B., a Bosnian national with multiple convictions who has been required to leave Germany for more than two decades. The father of eight participated in the right-to-remain program together with his family. As recently as November 2025, Cologne informed the state that no deportation was planned because of the family's participation in the program. It was reviewing whether they should be excluded because of the parents' criminal offenses.
One in Three Had Come to Police Attention
Only after Cologne's handling of the list became public did the state government have the names cross-checked against records held by the State Criminal Police Office. In addition to the original Western Balkans list of 1,573 people, there was a second list of 5,250 Iraqis required to leave Germany. Together, the two lists covered around 6,800 people.
Around 2,100 of them had come to police attention. About 1,000 were on the Western Balkans list and another 1,100 on the Iraq list. Collectively, they were linked to around 12,000 criminal investigations, including cases involving serious violence and sexual offenses.
The figures refer to police investigations, not only final convictions. Even Refugee Minister Verena Schäffer described the figure as high in the state parliament.
At the time, the ministry could not say how many of those listed had since obtained a right of residence, remained under Duldung status or were due to be deported. There was no statewide procedure for tracking the outcome of every case. A comprehensive review began only after the case of Huso B. and Cologne's failure to respond had already attracted public attention.
Cologne is now expected to review its entire right-to-remain program. North Rhine-Westphalia's district administrators are also calling on authorities to accept offers of assistance and ensure that criminal offenders who are required to leave the country are deported. Olaf Gericke of the CDU, president of the state's association of districts, pointed out that citizens expect existing law to be enforced.
The Coesfeld List shows that the problem was not a lack of names, clearly assigned responsibilities or offers of help. While a specialist authority sought to obtain documents and make use of spare seats on deportation flights, its request became bogged down between departments in Cologne. Foreign nationals with multiple convictions, meanwhile, were not being prepared for deportation but continued to be supported under a program intended to give them a path to permanent residence.