He later sought to match those words with action.

The Trump administration began reducing the US military presence in Europe while pressing its NATO allies to take greater responsibility for their own defense, or at least to shoulder more of the cost.

Economic policy also shifted rapidly. Trump's objective was to strengthen US industry, particularly sectors of strategic importance. He was prepared to pursue that goal even at the cost of higher consumer prices, strained relations with allies and the risk that weaker competition could ultimately undermine the US economy.

Although this appeared to mark a dramatic change, Trump was in many ways openly implementing a policy that had already been taking shape within the United States. China had become Washington's principal strategic rival. The reduced US presence in Europe, the drive for greater industrial self-sufficiency and the strategic pivot toward the Indo-Pacific all reflect that priority.

Iran Does Not Fit This Picture

Yet recent months have brought unexpected developments. The US intervention in Venezuela alone contradicted Trump's pledge not to start new wars. Even so, it broadly aligned with wider US strategy, as it reinforced American influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Several US interests converged in Venezuela. By backing the more compliant Delcy Rodríguez as president, Washington could more effectively counter the expansion of Chinese companies while helping ensure that the country's oil reserves did not fall under the influence of a strategic rival. At the same time, it secured greater influence over some of the world's largest hydrocarbon resources, despite the high cost of developing them.

However, a war in Iran does not quite fit into this logic.

Many analysts argue that intervention in Iran serves neither American strategic interests nor Trump's broader foreign policy objectives. They also point out that Israeli interests must be considered within this complex web of competing priorities.

The extent of Israel's influence over Trump remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that the administration's objectives in Iran were communicated inconsistently from the outset. Ultimately, preventing nuclear proliferation emerged as the primary goal. Yet Trump also spoke repeatedly of destroying Iran's military capabilities, forcing the country to surrender and even bringing about regime change.

That sits uneasily not only with his previous statements about avoiding new wars but also with his rejection of exporting the American model abroad.

Nor are the strategic gains for the United States especially convincing. Whether Iran was actively pursuing a nuclear weapon remains open to debate. What is clear is that the situation is now more dangerous than it was before.

None of Trump's stated objectives has been clearly achieved. Meanwhile, Iran has even less reason to trust the United States and greater incentive to pursue weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up the prices of oil, gasoline, jet fuel, natural gas, fertilizers and many other products, including within the United States.

Anyone arguing that the war served America's interests must therefore overlook a considerable amount of evidence.

Iran Confirms the Multipolar World

Paradoxically, however, the conflict has reinforced Trump's central argument that the United States is stepping back from its role as the world's policeman and ultimate security guarantor. It has also highlighted the limits of American military power, as recent developments in the Middle East have demonstrated.

According to three well-informed sources cited by Reuters, the US military has drawn heavily on its global stockpile of long-range precision missiles, particularly ground-launched systems such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). Two of those sources said the military had exhausted “practically everything” in its existing inventory.

Even more serious questions surround air defense interceptors. CNN recently reported that the United States has used around 80% of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles and roughly half of its Patriot interceptors.

Ukraine's declining success in intercepting Russian ballistic missiles reinforces that picture. Since Kyiv is now able to shoot down very few of them, it is reasonable to assume that its stockpile of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors has been exhausted, or is close to it.

Studies by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have for years warned about the rapid depletion of US stocks of key offensive and defensive missiles.

The fact that the United States has used large quantities of expensive munitions is not the main issue. More important is that replenishing those stockpiles will take months or even years. They were also depleted in what, from Washington's perspective, is a peripheral conflict rather than a direct confrontation with a rival superpower. (Links can certainly be drawn through global oil markets, but China has already demonstrated that it can sharply reduce oil consumption and, if necessary, switch to coal.)

Every missile launched over Iran is potentially one less available to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. That is one reason why analysts have increasingly speculated that the simultaneous strain of multiple conflicts could create a window of opportunity for Beijing to move against Taiwan.

Iran has therefore demonstrated that the United States cannot indefinitely sustain multiple military fronts while simultaneously deterring China. It must prioritize, because the era of uncontested American global hegemony has come to an end.

Europe Will Need Alliances and Pragmatism

For Europe, this new reality amounts to shock therapy. It may ultimately strengthen the continent, but it could equally prove deeply damaging.

The war in Iran has generated enormous uncertainty. Much of that uncertainty already existed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has given it a distinctly global dimension.

Europe faces an additional challenge: the United States is no longer prepared to act as the continent's unquestioned security guarantor. As a result, European countries will have to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, a process that is already underway. Yet in many critical technologies and advanced weapons systems, Europe remains far from self-sufficient.

The challenge extends beyond military capabilities. Europe must also secure strategic supply chains, from semiconductors and energy resources to rare earth elements and advanced manufacturing capacity.

If Europe is to move in that direction, it will have to defend its economic interests more assertively while strengthening cooperation both within the continent and with partners elsewhere. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney captured this point at the World Economic Forum in Davos earlier this year: “Middle powers must act together, because if we’re not at the table, we’ll end up on the plate.”

Cooperation alone, however, will not be enough. Europe must also mature politically and adopt a more pragmatic approach, setting aside ideological considerations when dealing with strategic issues.

That process would be helped if European institutions and member states showed greater respect for the division of competences between the EU and national governments. The less political energy devoted to cultural and ideological disputes, the more can be directed toward genuinely existential priorities.

Those priorities must be defined more clearly: security, industrial competitiveness, energy security and technological sovereignty. Other policies should then be assessed according to whether they strengthen or weaken those objectives.

If climate regulations are found to undermine Europe's industrial competitiveness, policymakers must be prepared to revise them. Likewise, if certain sanctions are primarily symbolic while imposing significant costs on the European economy, they should become the subject of renewed political debate.

This, above all, will be Europe's greatest challenge in the years ahead: to think strategically rather than ideologically and to reassess its own decisions on a continual basis. Pragmatism was an advantage during the era of American hegemony. In the emerging multipolar world, it may become a prerequisite for survival.