A reform passed under Viktor Orban in 2020 effectively made adoption by same-sex couples impossible. In principle, adoption is reserved for married couples, while single people may adopt only in exceptional cases, with the authorization of the minister responsible for family affairs. This provision also closed a loophole that had previously allowed a person in a same-sex relationship to adopt a child as an individual and, in some circumstances, for their partner subsequently to become a legal parent. Hungarian law thus effectively excluded same-sex couples from adoption, even though individual adoption by a single person was not formally prohibited.
The Orban government also passed a law in 2021 that severely restricted minors’ access to content depicting or promoting homosexuality or gender transition. Budapest justified these provisions by citing the need to protect children. In April 2026, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that this legislation violated EU law and contributed to the stigmatization and marginalization of LGBT people.
Magyar has chosen to respond to this decision. His government now intends to refocus the legislation on protecting minors from pornography, exploitation or genuinely harmful content rather than LGBT content per se.
The 2022 Referendum
But the issue remains politically explosive. In April 2022, alongside the parliamentary elections, Viktor Orban held a referendum on four questions concerning sex education, LGBT content and gender transition treatments for minors.
The referendum was invalid because it failed to meet the required turnout threshold. But among the valid votes, the “no” side won by an overwhelming majority: 92.3% on the issue of school programs addressing sexual orientation; 95.9% on the promotion of gender transition treatments; and more than 95% on the other two questions.
Public opinion has shifted since then. Recent surveys suggest Hungarian society is more divided and, on some issues, more liberal than it was during Orban’s tenure. A Median survey conducted after the April 2026 elections indicates that 57% of Hungarians want to reverse the major restrictions adopted in recent years, while 68% would support same-sex marriage and adoption.
However, this shift does not mean the issue is politically neutral. The 2022 referendum demonstrated strong mobilization around child protection, and the topic remains particularly sensitive among conservative voters.
Brussels Behind the Scenes
Magyar’s decision – which risks alienating a significant portion of his electorate – cannot be understood without considering Brussels' influence. His government has made rapprochement with Brussels one of its priorities. The financial benefits of this strategy are considerable: in May, the European Commission agreed to release €16.4bn ($17.5bn) in EU funds previously withheld from Hungary, following the reforms undertaken by the new government.
Magyar argues that the changes to legislation concerning LGBT rights are necessary to comply with EU law. His opponents, however, may see them as one of the conditions for Budapest’s return to Brussels’ good graces.
This is the interpretation advanced by leaders of the former ruling coalition. Balazs Orban, Viktor Orban’s former political director, responded succinctly to Magyar’s announcement, which was made in the name of “love”: “I will translate: gender ideology receives the green light.”
The issue therefore goes far beyond the legal status of same-sex couples. It touches on political sovereignty and a member state’s ability to retain leeway on social issues. Magyar may present his decision as merely bringing Hungary into compliance with European law. His opponents see it as a symbol of a Hungary that, in order to regain access to European funds and normalize its relations with Brussels, is gradually agreeing to dismantle part of the social model built by Viktor Orban.
While Hungarian public opinion is changing, issues related to family, education and identity remain sufficiently contentious to provoke a strong reaction from the conservative camp. By choosing to open this front just a few months after taking office, Peter Magyar therefore risks turning an effort presented as legal compliance into a cultural conflict. It will be up to him – and not to Brussels officials – to bear the political cost.
