In October 2024, the EU imported around 3,800 Chinese hybrid vehicles a month. By July 2026, that figure had reached 50,000. The tariffs did not stop the flow of imports so much as redirect it into a different vehicle category. Expecting Chinese manufacturers to keep supplying cars subject to steep surcharges, when an almost unimpeded alternative lay open to them, was unrealistic from the start.
China did what any serious competitor would do: it adjusted its offering. The EU had not taxed the actual problem, only one type of drive technology, and had failed to address the state subsidies, the lower production costs and China's control over large parts of the battery supply chain.
The consequences can no longer be glossed over. Europe's trade deficit with China reached around €360.6bn ($414bn) in 2025 and widened by a further 9% in the first half of 2026. On net, roughly €1bn ($1.15bn) now flow to China every day.
In her State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen acknowledged that the second "China shock" has long since begun and is already hitting Europe's industrial centers. Brussels is therefore also demanding restraint from Beijing on chemical products, alongside greater Chinese purchases in Europe. Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic is expected to present results by October.
The Ports Europe Gave Away
That Chinese goods reach Europe so effortlessly is no accident. Over the years, European states have ceded strategic parts of their logistics to Chinese corporations. Ports with stakes held by Chinese state-owned enterprises now handle more than 10% of Europe's container capacity, according to the European Parliament.
The state-owned shipping giant COSCO holds 67% of the Greek port of Piraeus, turning a European port into a key hub for China's trade with Europe, Africa and the Middle East. COSCO also owns 24.9% of the Tollerort container terminal in Hamburg, controls a terminal in Zeebrugge, Belgium, and holds stakes in Antwerp and Rotterdam.
In Spain, the company controls major terminals in Valencia and Bilbao, while other Chinese firms operate in ports from France to Malta. Europe was just as accommodating inland. No country has handed China its entire rail network, but Chinese and Hong Kong-based operators gained access to inland ports and transshipment hubs where containers are loaded onto freight trains, trucks and river barges.
China made no secret of its intentions. The New Silk Road was designed from the outset as a strategic network linking Chinese factories to the most important sales markets. Europe took the money all the same, treating every port, terminal and logistics node as an isolated commercial investment.
Brussels did not strike these deals alone. Governments, cities and port operators that needed capital or hoped for new trade flows also bear responsibility. But the EU allowed this to continue for years, only introducing a common framework for screening foreign direct investment in 2019. By then, many strategic positions had long since been given away.
The request to Beijing therefore reveals more than just a loophole in Europe's tariff regime. The EU has grown accustomed to negotiating the defense of its own interests with precisely those whose influence it wants to limit.
China is not responsible for saving Europe's auto industry. If Brussels wants to limit Chinese imports, it must set that limit itself and bear the resulting trade conflict. Asking a competitor for self-restraint is not a strategy. It is an admission that control has already been lost.
