Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pulled off a remarkable feat. Turkey remains a member of NATO while simultaneously building a second defense alliance modeled on NATO itself.
Together with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Ankara has established a new military pact in Mecca. The principle is simple: if one of the three countries comes under armed attack, the other two will consider it an attack on themselves. The partners will then jointly decide what assistance to provide.
The agreement therefore goes well beyond occasional military exercises or arms deliveries. It provides for a ministerial committee, a secretariat general based in Saudi Arabia, joint exercises and closer coordination between the armed forces. In a crisis, support could range from intelligence and logistics to ammunition and military units.
For Turkey, this is particularly remarkable. It has been a member of NATO since 1952 and has one of the alliance’s largest armed forces. Ankara is now participating in another system of mutual military commitments alongside one of the world’s most important oil-producing countries and nuclear-armed Pakistan. The name “Mecca Defense Pact” leaves little doubt about where the political center of the new alliance is intended to be.
Erdogan Is Already Thinking Bigger
The alliance is not intended to stop with its three founding members. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has already said that Erdogan wants to bring more countries into the pact. “We should not limit ourselves to three countries”, Fidan said. Membership should expand and, if necessary, additional states should be brought “under the umbrella”.
Egypt is already considered a potential candidate. Several other governments have reportedly also expressed interest. The three-country pact could therefore develop into a military bloc connecting a significant part of the Sunni Muslim world.
Turkey contributes its military and rapidly expanding defense industry. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial resources and political influence in the Gulf. Pakistan has nuclear weapons and one of the largest armed forces in the Islamic world. Egypt would add the most populous Arab country.
Ankara describes the project as a step toward greater regional independence. Fidan argues that countries in the region must increasingly organize their own security. Outside powers have failed to solve the region’s problems and, in some cases, have made them worse.
This fits Erdogan’s foreign policy of recent years. Turkey no longer wants to serve merely as the southeastern outpost of the Western alliance. Ankara maintains relations with Russia, expands its influence in Africa and Central Asia and conducts business with the Gulf states. At the same time, it retains all the benefits of NATO membership. The Mecca pact gives this policy a formal military structure for the first time.
Officially, the alliance is not directed against any particular adversary. Fidan explicitly stressed that it was not aimed at Iran. The timing, amid growing tensions in the Gulf, makes such assurances no less noteworthy.
What Happens If Both Alliances Call?
For NATO, this raises a question that it has rarely had to confront: What happens if Saudi Arabia or Pakistan one day enter an armed conflict with a NATO member? Turkey would suddenly find itself caught between two systems of mutual defense.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires NATO members to treat an armed attack on one ally as an attack on all. This does not automatically mean that every member must immediately send troops. Each country decides what assistance it considers necessary. Nevertheless, there is a clear political obligation toward the ally under attack. The Mecca pact now adopts a very similar principle for Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
A conflict involving members of the two systems would therefore not automatically trigger a declaration of war. Much would depend on who was considered the aggressor and whether the respective mutual-defense clauses applied. Politically, however, Ankara could still face a choice that would be extremely difficult to resolve.
The scenario is not entirely abstract. Pakistan has had a conflict-ridden relationship with India for decades. Saudi Arabia is deeply embedded in the Gulf security order and has its own regional rivalries. Turkey, meanwhile, has repeatedly experienced serious tensions in the eastern Mediterranean with Greece, a fellow NATO member.
NATO itself has already had to develop mechanisms to prevent two of its members from entering a military confrontation. A second alliance now increases the number of potential conflicts of loyalty. The situation would become particularly complicated if Erdogan actually expands the pact. The more countries that come under the new umbrella, the greater the possibility that their interests could one day collide with those of a NATO member.
That is where the real significance of the project lies. Turkey is not leaving the Western alliance, nor is it announcing a break with Washington or Europe. Instead, it is creating a second network of military commitments alongside NATO.
For Erdogan, the arrangement is highly convenient. Ankara retains its influence within NATO in Brussels. In Mecca, Turkey can simultaneously help build a separate security architecture for the Islamic world.
