Constitutional Reform Extends Beyond Politics
The amendment introduces a series of far-reaching institutional changes. Among other measures, it imposes an age limit on Constitutional Court judges, expands political oversight of parts of the judiciary, limits MPs to a maximum of 12 years in office, creates a new authority responsible for tracing and protecting state assets and changes the constitutional rules governing the presidency.
The most controversial provision concerns President Tamas Sulyok. Rather than relying on existing constitutional procedures for removing a head of state, the amendment stipulates that the incumbent president's term will automatically end on the day after the amendment enters into force. Parliament will then elect a successor, who will serve for up to five years or until the adoption of a new constitution, should one provide for a different term.
In practice, the amendment allows the newly elected parliamentary majority to terminate the mandate of a sitting president through a constitutional revision.
Magyar has argued that Sulyok failed to protect opposition politicians and activists who he says were targeted by Hungary’s security services during the election campaign. Former chess world champion Judit Polgar was mentioned as a possible successor, but she has since declined.
A President with Few Options
The amendment placed Sulyok in an extraordinary constitutional position.
Initially, he rejected calls to resign, arguing that neither the constitution nor existing legislation provided any legal basis for ending his mandate prematurely. He also warned that the amendment appeared to be directed at a single officeholder rather than establishing a general constitutional rule, raising concerns about legal certainty and the rule of law.
Seeking to clarify the constitutional questions involved, Sulyok became the first Hungarian president since the Fundamental Law entered into force in 2012 to request an abstract constitutional interpretation from the Constitutional Court. He asked whether constitutional amendments could lawfully be used to terminate the mandates of public officials already in office. He also appealed to the Council of Europe's Venice Commission.
Neither avenue produced an immediate answer.
Before Hungary's Constitutional Court could examine the case, seven judges recused themselves because of potential conflicts of interest, and the court's president removed the case from its docket. Meanwhile, the Venice Commission declined to accelerate its review and is expected to consider the matter during its October session.
Faced with those circumstances, Sulyok ultimately signed the amendment.
He argued that the constitution gave him no effective legal mechanism to block a duly adopted constitutional amendment and that refusing to promulgate it would itself have violated his constitutional duties. At the same time, he maintained that the amendment was inconsistent with fundamental constitutional principles.
By signing the amendment, Sulyok effectively brought his own presidency to an end. Until parliament elects a successor, Speaker of Parliament Agnes Forsthoffer is exercising the powers of the head of state.
Questions over Brussels' Response
The constitutional amendment has drawn criticism primarily from non-governmental organizations and legal experts rather than from European institutions. Human rights organizations argue that the changes weaken the rule of law by allowing constitutional provisions to be tailored to individual officeholders. Amnesty International has questioned both the removal of President Sulyok and the broader implications for judicial independence.
By contrast, the European Commission has so far refrained from publicly commenting on the constitutional amendment or announcing any formal legal action. That contrast is striking. In recent years, Brussels has shown itself willing to scrutinize rule-of-law concerns across the Union, including in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Critics therefore argue that the Commission's silence over Hungary's constitutional overhaul raises legitimate questions about whether it is applying the same standards consistently.
The debate has become more politically charged since the EU released more than €16bn ($18.24bn) in previously frozen funds to Hungary after Magyar took office. The Commission says the decision reflected Hungary’s fulfillment of agreed administrative conditions. The timing, however, has created the impression that Brussels has become less willing to confront Budapest over constitutional concerns.
Do the Reforms Conflict with European Legal Principles?
Whether Hungary's constitutional amendment amounts to a direct breach of EU law is a more complex question than political rhetoric sometimes suggests. The European Union has no general competence to regulate how member states appoint or remove their heads of state. Decisions concerning the presidency fall primarily within each country's constitutional order.
That does not mean, however, that constitutional amendments are beyond legal scrutiny.
European courts have repeatedly ruled that governments may not use constitutional or legislative changes to remove officeholders prematurely or undermine judicial independence.
The Court of Justice reached that conclusion in cases concerning Hungary's data protection commissioner and judicial retirement ages, while the European Court of Human Rights held in Baka v. Hungary that legislation should not be tailored to remove a specific officeholder. Although none of those judgments concerns a head of state, together they establish principles of legal certainty and institutional independence that critics say are relevant here.
The Venice Commission has consistently taken a similar position. It has argued that constitutional rules governing public office should be general, prospective and predictable, rather than drafted to affect identifiable individuals already serving fixed terms.
None of these decisions establishes that removing a president through constitutional amendment automatically violates EU law. Taken together, however, they point toward a broader European understanding that constitutional change should not be used to remove officeholders retroactively without compelling institutional justification.
An Uneven Application of Rule-of-Law Standards?
This distinction is important. The removal of Hungary's president is unlikely, by itself, to constitute a straightforward breach of EU law. Nevertheless, the manner in which it was achieved raises serious questions about legal certainty, separation of powers and the retroactive alteration of constitutional rules – principles that lie at the heart of the European conception of the rule of law.
Those concerns extend beyond the presidency.
The amendment simultaneously alters judicial retirement rules, restructures constitutional offices and changes the rules governing existing mandates. Viewed collectively, the reforms amount to a significant expansion of political control over institutions that were previously insulated from parliamentary majorities.
Whether that assessment ultimately results in legal action remains uncertain. What is notable, however, is that the European Commission has so far shown little inclination to intervene publicly. The contrast with previous cases is difficult to overlook.
When Romania's government attempted to remove President Traian Basescu in 2012, the Commission sharply criticized what it saw as attempts to circumvent constitutional safeguards and pressure judicial institutions. Similarly, the Commission intervened when Slovakia sought to end prematurely the mandate of Zuzana Dlugosova, head of the Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers, arguing that the move conflicted with EU law protecting the independence of such bodies.
The legal circumstances differ in each case. The Slovak dispute, for example, concerned obligations arising directly from EU legislation, whereas the constitutional status of a national president falls largely within domestic competence.
Even so, critics argue that the Commission's willingness to defend institutional independence appears to vary depending on the political context. That perception may ultimately prove more damaging than the legal questions themselves.
If Brussels is seen to apply the rule of law selectively – acting decisively against governments it opposes while remaining hesitant when politically sympathetic administrations adopt comparable constitutional measures – it risks undermining the credibility of one of its central political principles.
Peter Magyar has justified his reforms as necessary to dismantle the institutional legacy of Viktor Orban’s government. Replacing one constitutional majority with another, however, does not eliminate the danger of political arbitrariness.
Whether the European Union chooses to examine those reforms more closely may determine not only how Hungary's constitutional transformation is judged, but also whether the Union can continue to present itself as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.
